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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal protection of traditional knowledge 1 has assumed global
importance propelled in large part by the interest of pharmaceutical
companies and other biotechnology companies in the genetic resources2
of developing nations. Within the pharmaceutical industry, indigenous
people’s knowledge and experiences of the medicinal properties of plants
have played a pivotal role in the development of drugs.3 Similarly, the
botanical industry has relied on traditional knowledge to develop commercial
products, complement scientific testing, and verify laboratory research

1. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has defined traditional
knowledge as “tradition-based literary, artistic or scientific works; performances; inventions;
scientific discoveries; designs; marks and symbols; undisclosed information; and all other
tradition-based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in the
industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.” In this context, tradition-based refers to
“knowledge systems, creations, innovations and cultural expressions which have generally
been transmitted from generation to generation; are generally regarded as pertaining to a
particular people or its territory; have generally been developed in a non-systematic way;
and are constantly evolving in response to a changing environment.” WIPO, Intellectual
Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders: WIPO Report on
Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge (1998-1999),
at 25 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/tk/768/wipo_pub_768.pdf
[hereinafter Intellectual Property Needs]. Categories of traditional knowledge recognized
under this definition include: (i) agricultural knowledge; (ii) scientific knowledge; (iii)
ecological knowledge; (iv) medicinal knowledge, including related medicines and remedies;
and (v) biodiversity related knowledge. The definition also includes “expressions of folklore”
in the form of music, dance song, handicrafts, designs, stories and artwork; elements
of languages, such as names, geographical indications and symbols; and, movable cultural
properties. Excluded from this description of traditional knowledge are items not resulting
from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields, such as
human remains, languages in general, and “cultural heritage” in the broad sense. Id.
2. Genetic resources refer to genetic material of actual or potential value. Genetic
material is any material “of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional
units of heredity,” example of which include “material of plant, animal, or microbial
origin, such as medicinal plants, agricultural crops and animal breeds.” WIPO definition,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/genetic/.
3. See Norman R. Farnsworth, The Value of Plants Used in Traditional Medicine
for Drug Discovery, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1, 69 (2001) (noting that 80% of
122 compounds of defined structure found in 94 species of plants have had an
ethnomedical use identical or related to the current of the active elements of the plant).
Farnsworth discusses the use of plants in traditional medicine as starting points for drug
development and observed that “since plant-derived drug discovery began, the ethnomedical
approach has been more successful.” Id. at 74.
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results, including safety and efficacy.4 In the agriculture industry, traditional
knowledge is applied not only in seed development programs to improve
productivity, but also in crop protection programs to improve the
resistance of crop plants to pests and diseases.5
The commercial exploitation of traditional knowledge has taken place
amidst concerns about the erosion of community rights when non-indigenous
parties successfully acquire intellectual property rights over the knowledge
and resources of indigenous groups—a phenomenon referred to as biopiracy.6
Adverse implications of the legal monopolies obtained in this manner
include the frequent failure of the rights holders to compensate indigenous
groups7 as well as the expropriation of community interests in traditional
knowledge.8
Persons demanding greater sensitivity to the economic interests of the
creators of traditional knowledge insist on the equitable sharing of profits

4. KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY,
ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND BENEFIT SHARING 92 (1991).
5. For centuries, farmers in traditional areas improved varieties by adapting
germplasm to local conditions and selecting the best seed for each season, and it is this
knowledge that modern researchers have sought to tap through collaborative arrangements
with indigenous farmers. Paul Kuruk, The Role of Customary Law Under Sui Generis
Frameworks of Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional and Indigenous Knowledge, 17
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 67, n.8 (2007).
6. VANDANA SHIVA, ET AL., THE ENCLOSURE AND THE RECOVERY OF THE COMMONS 30
(1997).
7. Indigenous groups may not be properly rewarded for the exploitation of their
traditional knowledge, perhaps due to the deliberate refusal of the exploiters to pay,
difficulties in identifying the proper owners to whom payment is to be made, or simple
mismanagement. See generally D ARRELL P OSEY & GRAHAM D UTFIELD , B EYOND
I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 33–41 (1996).
8. There is expropriation of community interests when valuable pieces of traditional
knowledge are removed from the traditional communities and sent to western markets.
While some of these items may have been sold or given away by traditional elders, in
many cases, the items were probably illegally exported or even forcibly removed. Babacar
Ndoye, Protection of Expressions of Folklore in Senegal, 25 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REV.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 374, 375 (1989). Expropriation also occurs when farm seeds
are collected by researchers under collaboration arrangements and stored ex-situ beyond
the reach of traditional farmers who now have to pay high fees to acquire rights to improved
varieties of the seeds. See Stephen B. Brush, A Non-Market Approach to Protecting
Biological Resources, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A
SOURCEBOOK 131, 133 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. Furthermore,
community rights are diminished where some parties successfully acquire intellectual
property rights in other forms of traditional knowledge such as art and craft, music and
dance. For example, copyright may be claimed for documentation of information about
indigenous people, which is used commercially without appropriate acknowledgment as
to source of material. See POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 7, at 36.
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from the exploitation of traditional resources.9 Protection of traditional
knowledge, it is urged, would not only complement current international
efforts promoting the conservation and sustainable use of biological
resources as a way of increasing food production worldwide,10 but also
tackle problems associated with the widespread misrepresentation of
products11 and practices as indigenous,12 cultural degradation13 and the
9. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
5 (2001).
10. For centuries, traditional farmers have bred crop varieties and applied farming
techniques that suited their lands especially under adverse conditions. These practices are
still relevant in the modern era and it is believed that recognizing and encouraging the role
of farmers under a suitable protective regime would ensure the continued development of
specialized crops at the local level. Farmers Rights have been recognized in international
instruments on account of the critical role they play in food security. See What Are Farmers’
Rights?, http://www.farmersrights.org.
11. The commercial exploitation of traditional knowledge creates problems of
authenticity and misrepresentation as the need to satisfy the increased demand for
traditional art and craft often leads to mass-production, inferior quality goods, and cheap
imitations. Sandra Lee Pinel & Michael J. Evans, Tribal Sovereignty and the Control of
Knowledge, in SOURCEBOOK, supra notes 8, 41, 47. The mass-produced items sold as
traditional craft raise authentication problems to the extent they do not have the same
attributes as the traditional items. Items of traditional knowledge express important values
in traditional societies which the mass-produced items cannot possibly have since they did
not originate in those societies. Indeed, one commentator has characterized the production
and sale of fake indigenous items as “a cultural and psychological threat to the authentic
practitioners of traditional arts and to the traditional groups whose values those arts
express.” Alan Jabbour, Folklore Protection and National Patrimony: Developments and
Dilemmas in the Legal Protections of Folklore, 17 COPYRIGHT BULL. 10, 11 (1983).
12. Concerns about cultural degradation are found in the entertainment industry.
For example, some have charged that where African dances are copied and performed
abroad, African culture is denigrated to the extent that the “non-African actors cannot lend
the gestures that communicate warmth specific to Africa.” Ndoye, supra note 8, at 376.
Another writer contends:
[I]t is possible to encounter groups and soloists who unscrupulously modernize
works of folklore by arranging them in a new manner, by giving folk songs added
rhythm and volume at the expense of their melodic character . . . Performances
of folk songs often take the form of . . . banal impersonal shows devoid of the
characteristics peculiar to . . . folk dances . . . . As for the garishly-colored costumes
worn by the dancers, they are a travesty of the originals.
E.P Gavrilov, The Legal Protection of Works of Folklore, 20 COPYRIGHT MONTHLY REV.
WORLD INTELL. PROP ORG. 76, 79 (1984). Such commoditization of traditional performances,
it is feared, would eventually lead to the erosion of people’s cultural identity. POSEY &
DUTFIELD, supra note 7, at 6.
13. Indigenous culture is viewed to be degraded when cultural items are displayed
outside their traditional setting and for purposes different from those for which they were
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unauthorized public disclosure and use of secret knowledge, images14 and
other sensitive information15 pertaining to indigenous communities.
Responding to these concerns, the international community has over the
years undertaken a number of initiatives, including model laws and
recommendations on folklore, and provisions on cultural heritage and
human rights.16 However, beginning with the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) in 1992,17 there is now international interest in a remedial
solution premised on facilitating access to genetic resources in exchange
for the sharing of benefits. The Bonn Guidelines which were adopted in
2002,18 elaborate on the CBD provisions. With the adoption of the Nagoya
Protocol in 2010,19 the international community sought to improve the
protection of traditional knowledge by transforming the guidelines into
more specific commitments of governments. Earlier in 2001, the FAO

originally created as occurs for example, when religious artifacts are sold as mere
decorative art. David Sassoon, The Antiquities of Nepal: It is Time to Start Listening to
Communities Whose Possessions Have Become Objects of International Consumption,
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Fall 1991, 47, 49, available at http://www.culturalsurvival.org/
publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nepal/antiquities-nepal-it-time-start-listeningcommunities.
14. TERRI JANKE, OUR CULTURE, OUR FUTURE: REPORT ON AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (1998).
15. In the United States, Native American groups have fought against the use of
indigenous names in settings they perceive to be demeaning, such as in reference to mascots
and sports teams. One commentator notes:
Images of Indians have advertised and identified products and services too numerous
to list . . . . A search of the Trademarkscan-US Federal database in West law reveals
that derogatory names-Injun, Braves, Red Man, Squaw, and Redskins-are used
to sell everything from corn chips to football. Sports teams parade caricatured
Indian mascots, such as Chief Wahoo (Cleveland Indians) or Illiniwek (Fighting
Illini of Illinois). The Seminole activist Michale Haney describes many fans as
“cultural cross-dressers” decked out in a day glo warpaint and turkey feathers.
Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L.
REV. 1003, 1006–07 (1995).
16. See generally Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property
Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in
Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 812–19 (1999).
17. See generally Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
76, available at https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf.
18. Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization (2002), available at https://www.cbd.int/
doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines].
19. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(2011) Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/
protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf [hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].
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Plants Treaty was adopted reflecting some of the principles of the CBD,
but applicable only to plant genetic resources.20
To complement the global regime governing access to genetic resources
and enhance its effectiveness in addressing the problem of biopiracy, calls
have been made for the adoption of disclosure obligations in patent
applications regarding the source or origin of genetic resources or traditional
knowledge relevant to the claims in the application as well as evidence of
the obtainment of consent from, and agreement to share benefits with, the
rights holders of the traditional knowledge or genetic resources.21 Advocates
for an improvement in the regulatory environment for traditional knowledge
have turned to WIPO as a more appropriate forum for solutions given its
jurisdiction on matters of international intellectual property policy.22 A
major strategy WIPO has adopted in response is the preparation through
text-based negotiations of instruments that would incorporate the disclosure
requirement.23
The objective of this Article is to examine the disclosure requirement
as a measure to enhance the protection of traditional knowledge and
genetic resources. Section Two illustrates the negative effects of biopiracy
drawing on selected cases from Africa, India and the Americas while Section
Three describes the international regime governing access to genetic
resources and related traditional knowledge including rules on prior informed
consent, mutually agreed terms and the fair and equitable sharing of
benefits. Section Four traces the evolution of the obligation to disclose
from provisions in national model laws and a draft treaty on folklore prepared
by WIPO, to the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines as well as proposals before
the TRIPS Council of the World Trade Organization. This section also
discusses implications of the disclosure requirement, including triggers,
legal bases for, scope and sanctions for non-compliance. Section Five reviews
WIPO’s current program on the disclosure requirement and evaluates the
20. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov.
11, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303, available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf
[hereinafter FAO Plants Treaty].
21. The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement on Biological Diversity and
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, ¶ 4, June 18, 2003, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement and the CBD].
22. Infra notes 347–55 and accompanying text.
23. WIPO, Background Brief No. 1, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual
Property, at 3. Other proposals concern defensive protection measures including the creation
of databases on traditional knowledge. Id.
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latest proposals contained in the draft texts being used as the basis of
negotiations in WIPO for the adoption of international instruments on
traditional knowledge and genetic resources.
The Article concludes that the draft negotiating texts developed so far
by WIPO will require further refinement and alignment to be ready for
adoption as binding instruments. For WIPO member countries that are
generally supportive of the disclosure requirement, the discrepancies may
be seen as minor ones that could be ironed out in future negotiating
sessions. However, for others rigidly opposed to the requirement, such hopes
may not be realistic, leaving the distinct possibility that consensus may
not be found to submit even a significantly improved text to a diplomatic
conference for consideration for eventual adoption by WIPO. In the end,
if it proves impossible to restart the negotiations that have stalled at
WIPO, there will be an urgent need for like-minded traditional knowledge
provider countries in collaboration with interested traditional knowledge
user countries to respond to the void by working to develop solutions under
bilateral, regional or other multilateral arrangements for the protection of
traditional knowledge.
II. BIOPIRACY: A SPECIAL CONCERN IN THE EXPLOITATION OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC RESOURCES
Biopiracy is the appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources
of farming and indigenous communities by individuals or institutions that
seek exclusive monopoly control over the resources and knowledge usually
through the acquisition of patents or other intellectual property rights.24 It
constitutes a major abuse in the commercial exploitation of traditional
knowledge in terms of its adverse economic impacts on traditional
communities as companies have amassed huge fortunes from such acts
of misappropriation but failed to share those benefits with the communities
from where the genetic resources were originally accessed.25 On account
24. ETC Group, Patents & Biopiracy, http://www.etcgroup.org/issues/patentsbiopiracy (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). For a general overview of biopiracy, see Patrick R.
Mooney, Why We Call it Biopiracy, in R ESPONDING TO B IOPROSPECTING: FROM
BIODIVERSITY IN THE SOUTH TO MEDICINES IN THE NORTH 37, 37–44 (Hanne Svarstaf &
Shivscharn S. Dhillion eds., 2000); see also RAFI, Biopiracy Update: A Global Pandemic,
COMMUNIQUÉ, Sept.-Oct. (1995); (attributing the definition of biopiracy to Patrick Mooney).
25. For example, between 1994-1998, some University of Wisconsin scientists
obtained patents on ‘brazzein’ a super-sweet protein extracted from the berries of a West
African plant, Pentadiplandara brazzeana. Apparently, the scientists had ‘discovered’ the
super-sweet berries in Gabon, where local people had known and consumed the berries for
many years. However, “[d]espite being the inspiration and origin for brazzein, neither
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of the huge economic stakes involved, the international deliberations on
measures to counter biopiracy have been intense26 and strong lobbying by
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors has frustrated efforts to
develop adequate solutions.27 To situate the debate in context, it is useful
to recall some of the well-known cases of biopiracy that have been
reported.
A. Africa
Two prominent cases from Africa involve uses of the rosy periwinkle
and the hoodia cactus plants, native to Madagascar and South Af rica,
respectively. In the first case, knowledge about the traditional uses of the
rosy periwinkle played a key role in the development of the cancerfighting medicines Vincristine and Vinblastine.28 The use of the plant as
a cure for diabetes initially attracted the attention of researchers, but its
potential for cancer treatment was later examined.29 Subsequently, the
U.S. pharmaceutical company Eli Lily obtained patents for Vincristine
from which it reaped huge profits.30 However, Eli Lilly offered no benefits

Gabon nor its people . . . share[d] the benefits.” Someschwar Singh, Rampant Biopiracy
of South’s Biodiversity, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (July 20, 2000), http://www.twn.my/
title/rampant.htm.
26. See, e.g., infra notes 294–311 and accompanying text for a summary of the
debate in the World Trade Organization concerning the obligation to disclose information
about traditional knowledge in patent applications.
27. See ALEJANDRO ARGUMEDO & MICHEL PIMBERT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPENT, PROTECTING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AGAINST
BIOPIRACY IN THE ANDES 3 (2006) (noting how “strong lobbying” by US biotech and
pharmaceutical industries led to the exclusion of provisions ensuring that patents would
not be granted in the US without authorization of traditional knowledge holders in the free
trade agreement between Peru and the US).
28. Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J.
223, 223 (1964) (explaining that vincristine and vinblastine are used in treating childhood
leukemia and Hodgkin disease).
29. See, e.g., Anti-Cancer: Rosy Periwinkle, LIVING RAINFOREST, http://www.living
rainforest.org/about-rainforests/anti-cancer-rosy-periwinkle/ (last visited July 1, 2015).
30. See Andrew B. Cunningham, Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity: Global
Commons or Regional Heritage?, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Fall 1991, http://www.
culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/indigenous-knowledge-and-biodiversityglobal-commons-or-regional-heritag (explaining how the patent netted the company
approximately $100 million, 88% of which was profit to the company); see also Kadidal,
supra note 28, at 224.
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either to Madagascar or the indigenous group from which knowledge of the
medicinal uses of the plant had been obtained.31
With regards to the hoodia, it has traditionally been eaten by the San
people of the Kalahari Desert as an appetite suppressant on long hunting
trips32 and documented accounts dating back to 1798 by anthropologist
Francis Masson confirm this use of hoodia.33 After conducting detailed
spectroscopic analyses, the South African Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research (SACSIR) in 1995 applied for a patent for hoodia in
South Africa for use of the active components of the plant responsible for
suppressing appetite.34 SACSIR later signed an exclusive licensing agreement
in 1997 with Phytopharm, a UK company which in turn transferred to
Pfizer in 1998 the rights to develop and market a potential slimming drug
and cure for obesity from hoodia in exchange for $32 million in royalty
and milestone payments.35
The companies involved in the patenting and commercialization of
hoodia were criticized by non-governmental organizations for not contacting
the San people to seek their prior informed consent and also for failing to
set up appropriate benefit-sharing arrangements.36 Faced with threats of
lawsuits in 2001 by the San people for biopiracy,37 SACSIR signed a
memorandum of understanding in March 2002, which recognized the San
as the custodians of traditional knowledge associated with the Hoodia
plant.38 The following year, SACSIR set up the “San Hoodia Benefit-

31. James O. Odek, Biopiracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources,
2 J. INTELL PROP. L. 141, 147 (1994).
32. ETC Group, Worst Excuse: Winner–Phytopharm Inc., COMMUNIQUÉ, Mar./Apr.
2002, at 4.
33. DANIEL F. ROBINSON, CONFRONTING BIOPIRACY: CHALLENGES, CASES AND
INTERNATIONAL DEBATES 61 (2010).
34. Rachel Wynberg, Rhetoric, Realism and Benefit-Sharing: Use of Traditional
Knowledge of Hoodia Species in the Development of an Appetite Suppressant, 7 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 851–56 (2004).
35. ETC Group, supra note 32, at 4.
36. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 61–62.
37. In its defense, Phytopharm contended it had conducted extensive enquiries but
had not been able to find any of the “knowledge holders,” whose numbers had dwindled
and who apparently were living in a tented camp some 1,500 miles from their tribal lands.
On its part, the South African Council for Scientific Industrial Research claimed they had
planned all along to inform the San about the research and also share the benefits with
them, but wanted to make sure the drug proved successful before doing so. PRADEEP
KUMAR GANGWAR, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND IPRS: RELEVANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 176 (2011).
38. Id.
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Sharing Trust” which entitled the San to milestone payments and a share
of the royalties from the commercialization of hoodia.39
The Edmonds Institute, in cooperation with the African Centre for
Biosafety, presented a report in 2006 to a meeting of the Conference of
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in which the Institute
identified thirty-six examples of the development of medicines, cosmetics,
and agricultural and horticultural products from the biodiversity resources
in various African countries.40 In many of the cases, patents were obtained
from the use of African traditional knowledge by researchers and
biotechnology companies without the prior consent of, or sharing of
benefits with the traditional rights holders.
The report noted patents issued to Bayer in the U.S., Europe, and
Australia covering use of a microbe from Lake Ruiri in Kenya in the
production of Acarbose, a drug for the treatment of diabetes;41 a patent
obtained in the U.S. by Phytopharm covering the use of extracts of Artemesia
judaica, a Libyan medicinal plant for the treatment of diabetes;42 a patent
obtained by Glaxo-Smithcline for a streptomyces strain isolated from a
termite hill in the Gambia used both as an anti-fungal and as an
immunosuppressant;43 a U.S. patent obtained by Merck for a substance
produced by a fungus found in the dung of giraffes in a national park in
northern Namibia;44 and a U.S. patent granted to Sutherland Maciver, an
individual, for a drug made from proteins produced by amoeba from
Mauritius and used for the treatment of bacterial infections.45
Other cases cited in the report include a U.S. patent obtained by Option
Biotech, a Montreal based company covering the seeds of Afromomum
stipulatum, obtained from the Congo and used in an anti-impotency drug
called “Biovigora”;46 a US patent granted to a researcher from Tennessee
for a drug produced from milletia ferruginea, a medicinal plant found in
Ethiopia, with claims against “breast cancer, leukemia, melanoma, and
39. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOGENETIC RESOURCES AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 53 (2004).
40. Jay McGown, Out of Africa: Mysteries of Access and Benefit Sharing (Beth
Burrows ed., Edmonds Institute, 2006).
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id. at 3–4.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 5.
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myeloma,” and “viral infection, diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, tuberculosis,
or fungal infections;” 47 and a European patent issued to the German
company Max Planck Institut fur Kohlenforschung for claims covering
antibiotic compounds from countries along the West coast of Africa
stretching from Sierra Leone to Nigeria and used for treating infections.48
References were also made to a U.S. patent issued to an individual,
covering Iboga, a plant from Central and West Africa, for treating
drug addictions;49 a U.S. patent granted to a Tennessee inventor for use of
Kombic acid, a component of Kombo butter from Central and West Africa,
to lower cholesterol and fight cancer;50 U.S. patent issued to Unigen
covering an extract from Aloe ferox, a plant found in Southern Africa and
used as a skin whitener in personal care products;51 a U.S. and European
patents issued to a French company, the Dior Group, with claims on the
Okoume tree resin from Gabon and West Central Africa for use in
cosmetics and pharmaceuticals;5253 and U.S. patents issued to the Cognis
Corporation for skin care with claims for a simple extract from the
bambara groundnut grown in Sub-Saharan Africa.54
B. India
Patent rights in the turmeric plant, the neem tree and basmati rice were
at issue in three cases from India. The first case involved the grant of a
patent in 1995 to two Indian nationals at the University of Mississippi
Medical Centre for use of turmeric in wound healing.55 Subsequently, the
India-based Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) filed a
request for re-examination with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) arguing on prior art grounds that turmeric had been used for
thousands of years for healing wounds and rashes56 and supported its
claims with documentary evidence of traditional knowledge, including an
ancient Sanskrit text and a paper published in 1953 in the Journal of the

47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id. at 14.
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id. at 18.
55. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504.
56. Turmeric spice powder from the turmeric plant (curcuma longa) is widely used
in India for the treatment of wounds since the natural antibacterial agents of the powder
inhibit infection. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 71.
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Indian Medical Association.57 In 1997, the USPTO upheld the objections
of the CSIR and revoked the patent.58
In the second case, Robert Larson, a U.S. timber importer received a
patent in 1995 for a pesticide from a neem extract called Margosan-O,
which he later sold to W.R. Grace & Co., a multinational chemical
corporation.59 Extracts of the neem tree have traditionally been used in
pesticides, fungicides, soaps, candles, and cosmetics and as an antiinflammatory, or a preventive measure against malaria.60 In India, where
it is said to originate, it is referred to as a “natural pharmacy”61 or “curer
of all ailments,”62 and there is documentation of its use for over 2000 years
for agricultural and medicinal purposes.63 Following a legal challenge by
the Indian government on grounds of prior art, the pesticide patent granted
to Robert Larson was overturned in 2005.64
With regard to the third case, the USPTO in September 1997 granted a
patent on basmati rice lines and grains to a Texas-based company, RiceTec
Inc.65 Basmati is a common variety of rice that has been domesticated and
bred for centuries in India,66 and much of which is now exported to Asia,
Europe and the U.S.67 The grant of a patent on basmati rice sparked a lot
of outrage from Indian farmers and activists who feared it would create
an outright monopoly on basmati that could be used to curtail exports to

57. GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 174.
58. RAFI Communiqué, Basmati Rice Patent Update, Sept./Oct. 1997, at 8.
59. Other individuals and corporate entities also obtained patent on extracts of the
neem tree, including the US Department for a patent to extract an antifungal agent from
the tree, and American and Japanese companies for patents for various products derived
from the tree such as toothpaste, a traditional use of the plant. GANGWAR, supra note 37,
at 172.
60. POSEY & DUTFIELD, Beyond Intellectual Property, supra note 7, at 80.
61. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 71.
62. GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 172.
63. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 71.
64. BBC News, India Wins Landmark Patent Battle, Mar. 9, 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4333627.stm; see also GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 172–73.
65. U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484; Basmati Rice Update, in RAFI Communiqué
May/June 2000.
66. V ENDANA S HIVA , P ROTECT OR P LUNDER : U NDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 56–57 (2001); see generally Rai, M. Genetic Diversity in Rice production:
Past Contribution and the Potential of Utilization for Sustainable Rice Production, in Van
Tran, D. (Ed) Sustainable Production for Food Security: Proceedings of the 20th Session
of the International Rice Commission, Bangkok, Thailand, July 23–26, 2002, FAO, Rome.
67. See Shiva, supra note 66, at 56–57.
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the U.S.68 Responding to pressure, the Indian government filed an application
for re-examination of the patent and a settlement agreement was reached
with RiceTec for a withdrawal of some of the claims.69 As part of the
agreement, certain claims70 were cancelled and descriptions of the rice
were altered in the re-examination certificate, but the claims for novel rice
lines were maintained.71
While the settlement was seen as a significant victory in the figh t
against biopiracy, concerns lingered about the claims that had not been
withdrawn, especially given that the germplasm used to cross breed was
noted in the application to have originated in South Asia.72 Critics argued
that the process described in the claims was a simple crossbreed that was
obvious to anyone trained in plant breeding and was not novel on account
of the existing prior art in India regarding the basmati rice’s qualities.73
However, such arguments did not sway the USPTO because under the
U.S. standards of novelty and obviousness, references to the contributions
of Indian farmers relevant to the invention were to be disregarded to the
extent the contributions had not been described in a printed publication in
India at the time of the patent application.74

68. Public reaction may have been fueled by the rather broad wording and scope of
the patent. The patent claims were for a specific rice plant (Claims 1–11, 14), for seeds
that germinate the patented rice plant (Claim 12), for the grain that is produced by the rice
plant (Claims 13, 15–17) and for the method of selecting plants for breeding and propagating
particular grains of rice (Claims 18–20). Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents and
Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLOM. J. ASIAN L. 73, 101 (2003).
69. Id.
70. Claims 1–7, 10 and 14–20. Id.
71. Id.
72. One commentator has explained the lingering concerns as follows:
Analysis of the description of the patent document indicates that Claims 8, 9 and
11 refer to crossed lines varieties) to develop plant varieties that exhibit some
similar characteristics to basmati rice grains. Under US patent law, novel plant
varieties are eligible for protection—most countries in the world do not allow
plant patents. South Asian activists are particularly frustrated by this because it
appears that the germplasm used to cross the varieties was originally obtained
from the region. The patent description for the breeding of [the] . . . rice lines
indicates that:
Twenty-two basmati lines from the USDA [United States Department of
Agriculture] World Germplasm Collection, Beltsville, Md. and thirteen
semi-dwarf, long-grain lines were selected for the initial crosses. The basmati
seeds from the USDA were identified as having come from Pakistan.
(USPTO Patent Number 5,663,484).
ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 48.
73. See generally SHIVA, supra note 66, at 56.
74. The relevant provisions on prior art in the U.S. are as follows:
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C. The Americas
Ayahuasca and Enola bean were the subject of two cases from the
Americas. The first case concerned a U.S. plant patent obtained by Loren
Miller in 1986,75 which granted him rights over an alleged variety of the
Banisteriopsis caapi plant that he called “Da Vine.”76 In the patent
application, the Da Vine was described as a plant “discovered growing in
a domestic garden in the Amazon rain-forest of South America,” which
represented a new and distinct variety primarily because of the color of
the flower.77 For centuries, shamans of indigenous tribes throughout the
Amazon Basin used the bark of the Banisteriopsis caapi tree to produce a
ceremonial drink with hallucinogenic properties known as “ayahuasca,”
which means “vine of the soul.”78 Indeed, there is extensive documentation
of the use of ayahuasca in religious and healing ceremonies to induce
visions believed to enable the shamans to diagnose and treat illnesses,
meet with spirits, and divine the future.79
In March 1999, on behalf of a group of over 400 indigenous groups in
the Amazon basin, the Center for International Environmental Law
(CIEL) filed for re-examination of the patent on the grounds that a review
of the prior art revealed Da Vine to be neither new nor distinctive. 80 In
November 1999, upon consideration of the prior art provided by CIEL,
the USPTO rejected the patent claim, agreeing that Da Vine was not
distinguishable from the prior art presented by CIEL and therefore was
neither distinctive nor novel.81

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a) the invention is known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country, before he invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country more than one year
prior to the application for patent in the United States.
35 U.S.C. § 102.
75. ETC Group, COMMUNIQUÉ, Mar./Apr. 2002, at 2.
76. GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 174.
77. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 68.
78. GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 174.
79. Naranjo P., Hallucinogenic Plant use and Related Indigenous belief Systems in
the Ecuadorian Amazon, 1 J. ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 121–45 (1979).
80. See generally Glenn Wiser, Legal Elements of the “Ayahuasca” Patent Case,
CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL L. (1999).
81. Id.
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However, despite a final action notice, in a surprise development, the
USPTO allowed Miller to present new evidence and arguments ex parte
without giving CIEL a similar opportunity.82 In January 2001, on the basis
of the new evidence submitted by Miller, the USPTO reversed its earlier
decision and allowed the patent to stand for the remaining two years of its
term.83 Apparently, after conducting a side-by-side comparison of images
of the Da Vine plant with a number of other examples submitted by Miller,
the patent examiner determined that the leaf size and shape differed
sufficiently between the images of Da Vine and other ayahuasca plants.84
In addition, the examiner considered the fact that the plant had been found
in a cultivated area (i.e. a domestic garden) as significant.85 Ultimately,
these distinctions were deemed sufficient to qualify for protection under
the U.S. Patent Act.86
The Enola Bean case arose following a series of events stemming from
Larry Proctor’s time in Mexico. While vacationing in Mexico, Proctor
bought a bag of different varieties of beans that he found interesting
because of their yellow colour.87 Upon his return to the United States, he
began a selective breeding program,88 and two years later received a
patent89 for an invention relating to a new field bean variety, which he
called Enola.90 The patent claims covered a specific yellow-coloured bean
seed, plants produced by growing the seed, all other plants with the same
physiological and morphological characteristics, and also the breeding
82. Id.; see also Protecting Traditional Knowledge: Ayahuasca Patent Dispute,
CIEL, http://www.ciel.org/project-update/protecting-traditional-knowledge-ayahuasca/ (last
visited Nov. 23, 2015).
83. Id.
84. Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Patent No. PP5,751 C1 (filed Mar. 30, 1999)
(reexamination cert. issued Apr. 17, 2001).
85. Id.
86. For plant patent requirements, see 35 U.S.C. § 161, which provides: The US
Patent Act provides in relevant part:
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new
variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated
state, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title.
US Patent Act, Section 35 U.S.C. § 161.
87. See ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 51.
88. Id.
89. U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (filed Nov. 15, 1996); see generally ETC Group,
Enola Patent Ruled Invalid: Haven’t We Bean Here Before? (Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes and Yes)
(July 14, 2009), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/content/enola-patent-ruled-invalidhaven%E2%80%99t-we-bean-here-yes-yes-yes-yes-and-yes-0.
90. See ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 51.
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methods employed.91 Proctor aggressively defended his patent by suing
other companies that grew the bean and requesting royalties on imports
from Mexico.92 His tough stance affected export sales from Mexico,
which dropped over ninety percent, causing severe economic damage to
more than 22,000 farmers in northern Mexico who depended on sales
from this bean.93
Although Proctor acknowledged that his Enola bean originated in
Mexico,94 he claimed that the bean was novel because it had a distinctive
yellow color and had never been grown in the U.S.95 However, information
from the Mexican government contradicted this claim, pointing out that
yellow beans known as mayocoba had been grown for generations in
Mexico and were the likely source for Proctor’s so-called invention. There
was also evidence that beans similar to Enola beans had been grown in
the U.S. since the 1930s.96
Armed with the expert studies indicating that Proctor’s Enola bean was
identical to the Mexican bean,97 and with support from Food Agriculture
Organization, the Colombia-based International Centre for Tropical
Agriculture challenged the patent in 2000.98 In April 2008, the USPTO
rejected all of the patent claims for Enola, a decision that was welcomed
by many, but to others was a hollow victory and a travesty because the
U.S. patent system had “allowed the owner of a flagrantly unjust patent to
91. Id.
92. See ETC Group, Proctor’s Gamble: Yellow Bean Patent Owner Sues 16 Farmers
and Processors in US (Dec. 17, 2001), http://www.etcgroup.org/content/proctors-gamble.
93. GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 177; see also Protecting Traditional Knowledge:
Ayahuasca Patent Dispute, CIEL, http://www.ciel.org/project-update/protecting-traditionalknowledge-ayahuasca/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
94. In his patent application, Proctor stated “The yellow bean ‘Enola’ variety is
mostly likely a landrace from the azufrado-type varieties” (which originate in Mexico).
ETC Group, Cancel the Enola Bean Patent!, http://www.etcgroup.org/content/cancelenola-bean-patent.
95. Erin Donovan, Beans, Beans, the Patented Fruit: The Growing International
Law Conflict over the Ownership of Life, LOY. L.A INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 120–21
(2003).
96. Id. at 125–26.
97. See GANGWAR, supra note 37, at 177 (explaining that scientific studies had
concluded that “probability calculations of matching the specific Enola fingerprint showed
that the most likely origin of Enola is by direct selection within pre-existing yellow-bean
cultivars from Mexico, most probably ‘Azufrado Peruano’”).
98. ETC Group, Whatever Happened to the Enola Bean Challenge (Dec. 21, 2005),
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/whatever-happened-enola-bean-patent-challenge.
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legally monopolize markets and destroy competition . . . for close to half
the 20-year term.”99
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING ACCESS
TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND RELATED
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
A. Articulating the Principles: The Convention on
Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted in 1992 to
provide for “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilization of genetic resources.”100 Protection of biological
diversity was considered critical to stem the rapid erosion of such diversity
by human activities not only because of the “intrinsic value of biological
diversity and of [its] ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific ,
educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values” 101 but also its
importance “for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining systems of
the biosphere.”102 Specifically, conservation of biological diversity was
urgently needed to meet the “food, health and other needs of the growing
world population.”103
Premised on the principle that “[s]tates have . . . the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and
control do not cause damage to the environment,”104 the CBD provides for
various measures concerning conservation and sustainable use,105 duties of

99. ETC Group, Hollow Victory: Enola Bean Patent Smashed At Last (Maybe)
(Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.etcgroup.org/content/hollow-victory-enola-bean-patent-smashedlast-maybe.
100. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 17, art. 1.
101. Id. at Preamble.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. Under the CBD, Contracting States should “[d]evelop national strategies, plans
or programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity . . . [and] . . .
[i]ntegrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity into relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans, programmes and policies.” Id.
art. 6.
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identification and monitoring,106 and measures related to in-situ107 and exsitu108 conservation, access to genetic resources109 and access to and transfer
of technology.110
106. Contracting States are obligated to:
(a) [i]dentify components of biological diversity important for its conservation
and sustainable use . . . (b)[m]onitor, through sampling and other techniques, the
components of biological diversity identified . . . above, paying particular attention
to those requiring urgent conservation measures and those which offer the
greatest potential for sustainable use; (c)[i]dentify processes and categories of
activities which have or are likely to have significant adverse impacts on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and monitor their
effects through sampling and other techniques; and (d) [m]aintain and organize,
by any mechanism data, derived from identification and monitoring activities
[specified].
Id. art. 7.
107. With regards to in-situ conservation, Contracting States are required among
other things, to:
(a) Establish a system of protected areas or areas where special measures need
to be taken to conserve biological diversity; (b) Develop, where necessary,
guidelines for the selection, establishment and management of protected areas
or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity;
(c) Regulate or manage biological resources important for the conservation of
biological diversity whether within or outside protected areas, with a view to
ensuring their conservation and sustainable use; (d) Promote the protection of
ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of species in
natural surroundings; (e) Promote environmentally sound and sustainable
development in areas adjacent to protected areas with a view to furthering
protection of these areas; (f) Rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems and
promote the recovery of threatened species, inter alia, through the development
and implementation of plans or other management strategies; (g) Establish or
maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks associated with the use
and release of living modified organisms resulting from biotechnology which
are likely to have adverse environmental impacts that could affect the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to
human health; (h) Prevent the introduction of, control or eradicate those alien
species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species; (i) Endeavour to provide
the conditions needed for compatibility between present uses and the conservation
of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components; . . . [and] (k)
Develop or maintain necessary legislation and/or other regulatory provisions for
the protection of threatened species and populations. . . .
Id. art. 8.
108. As to ex-situ measures, the Contracting States are expected to:
(a) Adopt measures for the ex-situ conservation of components of biological
diversity, preferably in the country of origin of such components; (b) Establish
and maintain facilities for ex-situ conservation of and research on plants, animals
and microorganisms, preferably in the country of origin of genetic resources;
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The provisions of the CBD dealing with the protection of biological
resources “reflect a compromise between the need by parties from the
North for access to biological resources of the South versus the demands
of the South to restrict such access,”111 and the balance was struck “to
facilitate access to biological resources while ensuring the transfer of
some benefits to providers of such resources”112 in the hope in part, that
such returns “would in turn provide the incentive for the preservation of
environmentally sound practices.”113 To this end, Article 8(j) of the CBD
calls on Contracting States to “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge,
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity.”114 In addition to promoting the wider application of
such knowledge, innovations, and practices, with the approval and involvement
of the holders thereof, the CBD encourages the equitable sharing of the
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations, and
practices.115 Significantly, one of the measures recommended for supporting
the sustainable use of components of biological diversity is the protection
and encouragement of the use of biological resources in accordance with
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or
sustainable use requirements.116
While the CBD recognizes both the sovereign rights of States over their
natural resources and the authority to determine access to genetic resources
found in their territories,117 it urges contracting parties to create conditions
to facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses
and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the objectives of this
Convention.118 In general, such access is to be based on the prior informed

(c) Adopt measures for the recovery and rehabilitation of threatened species and
for their reintroduction into their natural habitats under appropriate conditions;
[and] (d) Regulate and manage collection of biological resources from natural
habitats for ex-situ conservation purposes so as not to threaten ecosystems and
in-situ populations of species. . . .
Id. art. 9.
109. Id. art. 15.
110. Id. art. 16.
111. Kuruk, Role of Customary Law, supra note 5, at 73.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 17, art. 8(j).
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 10(c).
117. Id. art. 15(1).
118. See id. art. 15(2).
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consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources119 and on
mutually agreed upon terms.120 It also calls upon parties to share in “a fair
and equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits
arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources.”121
Article16 calls upon parties to provide and/or facilitate access to and
transfer of technology to developing countries “on fair and most favourable
terms”122 and to adopt the necessary legislative, administrative or policy
measures to ensure the private sector facilitates the access to, joint
development and transfer of developing countries.123 The Article also
calls for international cooperation in achieving the objectives of the
Convention.124
However, the three basic principles introduced in the CBD regarding
prior informed consent, fair and equitable sharing of benefits, and mutually
agreed terms, are not elaborated in the CBD. This lack of clarity may leave
some doubt regarding the precise scope of their application—it was to
remedy this deficiency that the Conference of the Parties set in motion a
process that led first to the adoption of the Bonn Guidelines, and more
recently, the Nagoya Protocol.
B. Transforming Principles to Guidelines: The Bonn Guidelines
The Bonn Guidelines were intended to assist governments in “developing
and drafting legislative, administrative or policy measures on access and
benefit-sharing, and contracts and other arrangements under mutually
agreed terms for access and benefit-sharing.”125 They were also designed
to inform the practices and approaches of stakeholders (users and providers)
in access and benefit-sharing arrangements;126 improve capacity-building
in developing countries;127 promote the transfer of technology to developing
countries; and positively influence the development of laws that recognize

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. art. 15(5).
Id. art. 15(6).
Id. art. 15(7).
Id. art. 16(2).
See id. art. 16(4).
Id. art. 16(5).
Bonn Guidelines, supra note 18, at 1.
Id. § 11(d).
Id. § 11(e).
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the protection of customary law of indigenous communities.128 With the
exception of human genetic resources, all genetic resources, associated
traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices covered by the CBD,
and benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of such
resources are covered by the Bonn Guidelines.129
Under the Bonn Guidelines, prior informed consent is required for
access to genetic resources.130 The decisions on applications for access
are to be rendered in a timely manner.131 Prior informed consent is associated
with the specific uses for which consent is granted.132 Thus, any change
in use following the grant of consent would require a new application.133
Further, permission granted to access genetic resources would not necessarily
imply permission to use associated knowledge, and vice versa.134 To
assist in the development of a system of prior informed consent, the Bonn
Guidelines elaborate on the key principles135 and elements136 of the system.
They also elaborate on minimum requirements137 and elements138 for
128. Id. § 11(g).
129. Id. § 9.
130. Id. § 24.
131. Id. § 28.
132. Id. § 34.
133. Id. § 34.
134. Id. § 37.
135. The basic principles are listed as:
(a) Legal certainty and clarity; (b) Access to genetic resources should be facilitated
at minimum cost; (c) Restrictions on access to genetic resources should be
transparent, based on legal grounds, and not run counter to the objectives of the
Convention; (d) Consent of the relevant competent national authority(ies) in the
provider country . . . [and] . . . consent of relevant stakeholders, such as indigenous
and local communities, as appropriate to the circumstances and subject to domestic
law, should also be obtained.
Id. § 26.
136. The elements of a prior informed system are identified as “(a) Competent
authority(ies) granting or providing for evidence of prior informed consent; (b) Timing
and deadlines; (c) Specification of use; (d) Procedures for obtaining prior informed
consent; (e) Mechanism for consultation of relevant stakeholders; (f) Process.” Id. § 27.
137. In terms of the basic requirements for mutually agreed terms, the following are
noted:
(a) Legal certainty and clarity; (b) Minimization of transactions costs; (c) Inclusion
of provisions on user and provider obligations; (d) Development of different
contractual arrangements for different resources and for different uses and development
of model agreements; (e) Different uses may include, inter alia, taxonomy,
collection, research, commercialization; (f) Mutually agreed terms should
be negotiated efficiently and within a reasonable period of time; (g) Mutually
agreed terms should be set out in a written agreement.
Id. § 42.
138. The following are identified as guiding parameters in a contractual arrangements.
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mutually agreed terms, which are illustrated in an indicative list, including
type and quantity of genetic resources, and the geographical/ecological
area of activity.139
The fair and equitable sharing of benefits is no doubt the most important
scheme in the CBD from the standpoint of indigenous peoples and
developing countries. To this end, the Bonn Guidelines mandate that the
terms of access include the conditions, obligations, procedures, types,
timing, distribution and mechanisms of benefits to be shared.140 For this
purpose, near-term, medium-term and long-term benefits are to be considered,
including up-front payments, milestone payments and royalties, with the
time-frame of benefit-sharing being clearly stipulated.141
Appendix II contains an illustrative list of monetary and non-monetary
benefits deemed to satisfy the objectives of the CBD. The monetary benefits
include: access fees; up-front payments; milestone payments; payment of

(a) Regulating the use of resources in order to take into account ethical concerns
of the particular Parties and stakeholders, in particular indigenous and lo cal
communities concerned; (b) Making provision to ensure the continued customary
use of genetic resources and related knowledge; (c) Provision for the use of
intellectual property rights include joint research, obligation to implement rights
on ‘inventions obtained and to provide licenses by common consent; (d) The
possibility of joint ownership of intellectual property rights according to the
degree of contribution.
Id. § 43.
139. The indicative list of typically mutually agreed terms is outlined as
(a) Type and quantity of genetic resources, and the geographical/ecological area
of activity; (b) Any limitations on the possible use of the material; (c) Recognition
of the sovereign rights of the country of origin; (d) Capacity-building in various
areas to be identified in the agreement; (e) A clause on whether the terms of the
agreement in certain circumstances (e.g., change of use) can be renegotiated; (f)
Whether the genetic resources can be transferred to third parties and conditions
to be imposed in such cases, e.g. whether or not to pass genetic resources to third
parties without ensuring that the third parties enter into similar agreements except for
taxonomic and systematic research that is not related to commercialization; (g)
Whether the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities have been respected, preserved and maintained, and whether the
customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices
has been protected and encouraged; (h) Treatment of confidential information;
(i) Provisions regarding the sharing of benefits arising from the commercial and
other utilization of genetic resources and their derivatives and products.
Id. § 44.
140. Id. § 45.
141. Id. § 47.
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royalties; license fees in case of commercialization; special fees to be paid
to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity;
salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed; research funding;
joint ventures; and joint ownership of intellectual property rights.142 On
the other hand, notable examples of non-monetary benefits include: sharing
of research and development results; collaboration, cooperation and
contribution in scientific research and development programmes
(particularly biotechnological research activities); participation in product
development; and food and livelihood security benefits.143
The Bonn Guidelines require each Contracting State to designate one
focal point for access and benefit-sharing and to make such information
available through a clearinghouse mechanism.144 It is the responsibility
of the focal point to disclose to prospective applicants for access to genetic
resources information about the relevant indigenous groups and
stakeholders.145 Such disclosure would go a long way in reducing instances
of misappropriation of identities of the proper owners and would enable
applicants to seek the approval of indigenous groups—a necessary
precondition to obtaining the prior informed consent of the national
competent authority.146
Section 14 of the Bonn Guidelines requires national competent authorities
to advise on mechanisms for effective participation of indigenous groups
in the different stages in the process of access and benefit-sharing.147 For
example, these required advising mechanisms would ensure that the
decisions and processes are made available in a language understandable
to relevant indigenous peoples. 148 Additionally, national consultative
committees are required to be set up.149 Advice provided by these institutions
would further the education of indigenous people about their rights and
thus assure that they understand fully the implications of the contractual
arrangements into which they may enter. Indeed, the duties imposed on
competent national authorities are consistent with the Bonn Guidelines’
requirement that states support measures “to enhance indigenous and local
communities’ capacity to represent their interests fully at negotiations.”150

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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Id. Appendix II (2).
Id. § 13.
Id. § 13.
Id. § 26.
Id. § 14(g).
Id. § 14(h).
See id. § 19.
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Under the Bonn Guidelines, access to and use of biological resources
must comply with and must not violate the customary rights of indigenous
groups.151 Thus, Section 16(a)(iii) calls on States to take steps “to ensure
that the commercialization and any other use of genetic resources [does]
not prevent traditional use of genetic resources.”152 Furthermore, in the
implementation of mutually agreed terms, “users are to respect customs,
values and customary practices of indigenous communities.” 153 The
indicative list of mutually agreed terms includes a reference to “whether
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities
have been respected, preserved and maintained, and whether the customary
use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices has
been protected and encouraged.”154 Guarantees are also provided in the
instrument for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits with all those who
have been identified as having contributed to the resource management,
scientific and/or commercial process, including institutions and indigenous
and local communities.155
Significantly, the Bonn Guidelines call on countries to adopt measures
“to encourage the disclosure of the country of origin of the genetic resources
and of the origin of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of
indigenous and local communities in applications for intellectual property
rights.”156 These disclosures would be highly relevant in tackling cases of
improper patent grants where examining authorities fail to take into
account prior uses of associated traditional knowledge in other countries.
Ultimately, these disclosures could be used to deny or revoke patents
derived from traditional knowledge.
C. From Guidelines to Binding Commitments: The Nagoya Protocol
1. The Provisions
While the access and benefit provisions in both the CBD and the Bonn
Guidelines contain several provisions potentially benefitting indigenous

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. § 16.
Id. § 16(a)(iii).
Id. § 16(a)(iii).
Id. § 44(g).
See id. § 48; see also § 16.
Id. § 16(d)(ii).
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groups, the exhortatory nature of the provisions in the CBD, coupled with
the voluntary nature of the Bonn Guidelines, render those instruments of
little use in a State that is determined not to recognize the rights of its
indigenous groups. Without a binding international framework that imposes
specific commitments on states, the goals and objectives under the two
instruments will not be adequately realized. For, the contract-based solutions
in the CBD and Bonn Guidelines are largely domestic strategies and are
simply inadequate for tackling certain problems associated with the use of
genetic resources which have international dimensions and tend to require
international cooperation with regards to jurisdictional and enforcement
matters.157 In light of these considerations, the international community
continued with efforts to establish an enhanced regime to complement those
instruments leading to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol in October
2010.
a. Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing
Under the Nagoya Protocol, benefits arising from the utilization of genetic
resources as well as from subsequent applications and commercialization
are to be shared in a fair and equitable way and on mutually agreed terms,
with the Provider Party that is the country of origin or a Party that has
acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention,158 or
relevant indigenous and local communities.159 Benefits are defined in this

157. As noted elsewhere,
… the best drafted contract is meaningless if the party who breaches the contract
moves out the state where the contract was entered into and establishes residence
in another country. Without cooperation from the second country, courts in the
first country cannot acquire jurisdiction over that party to make him account for
the breach. Similar issues will arise if the party moved out of the first country to
avoid paying a judgment issued against him for breach of an access- and benefitsharing contract. Without cooperation from the second country, it will be impossible
to enforce the judgment. Furthermore, if the party in breach of the contract were
to acquire in the second country intellectual property rights related to the genetic
resources obtained in the first country, again, without the second country moving
cooperatively to revoke the intellectual property rights, the indigenous groups in
the first country who have ownership claims in the resource in general would
have no adequate legal remedies. Their only option might be to travel to the
second country to initiate legal action there, but that could be an expensive
strategy and full of uncertainties for the indigenous groups lacking of familiarity
with foreign laws.
Paul Kuruk, Mutual Recognition Agreements and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 38
COMMONWEALTH TRADE HOT TOPICS 1, 3–4 (2004).
158. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 19, art. 5(1).
159. Id. art. 5(2), (5).
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context160 and identified in an Annex to the Protocol to include monetary161
and non-monetary benefits.162 The Nagoya Protocol obligates each Party
to encourage the development and use of sectoral and cross-sectoral model
contractual clauses for mutually agreed terms,163 as well as voluntary codes
of conduct, guidelines and best practices and/or standards in relation to
access and benefit-sharing.164 Mutually agreed terms are to be set out in
writing and may include, inter alia provisions on: dispute settlement;
benefit-sharing, including in relation to intellectual property rights; thirdparty uses; and changes of intent, where applicable.165
160. Id. art. 5(4).
161. Id. Annex § 1. The monetary benefits are listed as:
(a) access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired; (b) up-front payments;
(c) milestone payments; (d) payment of royalties; (e) license fees in case of
commercialization; (f) special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation
and sustainable use of biodiversity; (g) salaries and preferential terms where
mutually agreed; (h) research funding; (i) joint ventures; and (j) joint ownership
of relevant intellectual property rights.
162. Id. Annex § 2. The non-monetary benefits may include, but not be limited to:
(a) sharing of research and development results; (b) collaboration, cooperation
and contribution in scientific research and development programmes, particularly
biotechnological research activities, where possible in the Party providing
genetic resources; (c) participation in product development; (d) collaboration,
cooperation and contribution in education and training; (e) admittance to ex situ
facilities of genetic resources and to databases; (f) transfer to the provider of the
genetic resources of knowledge and technology under fair and most favourable
terms, including on concessional and preferential terms where agreed, in particular,
knowledge and technology that make use of genetic resources, including
biotechnology, or that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable utilization
of biological diversity; (g) strengthening capacities for technology transfer; (h)
institutional capacity-building; (i) human and material resources to strengthen
the capacities for the administration and enforcement of access regulations; (j)
training related to genetic resources with the full participation of countries
providing genetic resources, and where possible, in such countries; (k) access to
scientific information relevant to conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, including biological inventories and taxonomic studies; (l) contributions to
the local economy; (m) research directed towards priority needs, such as health
and food security, taking into account domestic uses of genetic resources in the
Party providing genetic resources; (n) institutional and professional relationships that
can arise from an access and benefit-sharing agreement and subsequent collaborative
activities; (o) food and livelihood security benefits; (p) social recognition; and
(q) joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.
163. Id. art. 19(1).
164. Id. art. 20(1).
165. Id. art. 6(3)(g).
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b. Prior Informed Consent
As part of the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources, access
to genetic resources for their utilization is subject to the prior informed
consent of the Provider Party166 and, in accordance with domestic law, the
Parties must take appropriate measures to ensure that the prior informed
consent or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities is
obtained for access to genetic resources where they have the established
right to grant access to such resources.167
Each Party requiring prior informed consent is obligated to adopt
appropriate legislative, administrative or policy measures to provide for
legal certainty, clarity and transparency of its domestic access and benefitsharing legislation or regulatory requirements; fair and non-arbitrary rules
and procedures on accessing genetic resources; information on how to
apply for prior informed consent; and clear and transparent written decisions
by a competent national entity, in a cost-effective manner and within a
reasonable period of time.168 The Party should also provide for the issuance
of a permit or its equivalent as evidence of the decision to grant the prior
informed consent and of the establishment of mutually agreed terms. 169
Where applicable, and subject to domestic legislation, the Party should set
out criteria and/or processes for obtaining prior informed consent or
approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities.170
c. Global Multilateral Benefit Sharing Mechanism and
Transboundary Cooperation
The Nagoya Protocol obligates Parties to explore the need for and
modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources
that occur in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to
grant or obtain prior informed consent.171 The benefits shared by users of
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge through this
mechanism are to be used to support the conservation of biological
diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally.172

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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Where the same genetic resources are found in situ within the territory
of more than one Party, or where the same associated traditional knowledge
is shared by one or more indigenous and local communities in several
Parties, those Parties are to cooperate in the implementation of the Protocol
with the involvement of the relevant indigenous and local communities.173
d. National Focal Points and Competent National Authorities
Each Party is to designate a national focal point to act as liaison with
the CBD Secretariat and provide information 174 concerning competent
national authorities, relevant indigenous and local communities and relevant
stakeholders. To applicants seeking access to genetic resources or associated
traditional knowledge, the focal points are to provide information on
procedures for obtaining prior informed consent or approval and involvement
of indigenous and local communities, and establishing mutually agreed
terms including benefit-sharing.175
Each Party is also expected to designate one or more competent national
authorities to be responsible for granting access or issuing written evidence
that access requirements have been met and to be responsible for advising
on applicable procedures and requirements for obtaining prior informed
consent and entering into mutually agreed terms.176 However, if it chooses
to do so, a Party may designate a single entity to fulfill the functions of
both focal point and competent national authority.177
e. The Access and Benefit Sharing Clearing House
The Protocol established an Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House to
serve as a means for sharing information and to provide access to relevant
information made available by each Party,178 including legislative,
administrative and policy measures on access and benefit-sharing;
information on the national focal point and competent national authority
or authorities; and permits or their equivalent issued at the time of access

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 13(1).
Id.
Id. art. 13(2).
Id. art. 13(3).
Id. art. 14(1).
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as evidence of the decision to grant prior informed consent and of the
establishment of mutually agreed terms.179 Other information available
through the Clearing-House includes the competent authorities of indigenous
and local communities; model contractual clauses; methods and tools
developed to monitor genetic resources; and codes of conduct and best
practices.180
f. Compliance with Domestic Legislation or Regulatory
Requirements of Other Party
The Protocol obligates each Party to take appropriate, effective and
proportionate legislative, administrative or policy measures to ensure that
genetic resources or associated traditional knowledge utilized within its
jurisdiction have been accessed in accordance with prior informed consent
or approval and involvement of indigenous and local communities. It also
requires that mutually agreed upon terms be established, as required by
the domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements
of the other Party.181 In addition, each Party is to provide appropriate, effective
and proportionate remedial measures to address situations of non compliance 182 and to cooperate in cases of alleged violation of domestic
access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements of the
other parties.183
g. Monitoring Utilization of Genetic Resources
To monitor and to enhance transparency about the utilization of genetic
resources, the Parties are expected to set up checkpoints,184 and encourage
users and providers to adopt provisions in their contracts agreeing to share
information on the implementation of their obligations, including through
reporting requirements.185 It is the responsibility of a checkpoint to collect
or receive relevant information related to prior informed consent, source
of the genetic resource, establishment of mutually agreed terms, and/or
utilization of genetic resources.186 A Party may impose an obligation on
users of genetic resources to provide such information at a designated
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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checkpoint and take appropriate, effective and proportionate measures to
address situations of non-compliance.187 The information obtained by the
checkpoints would in turn be provided to national authorities, to the Party
providing prior informed consent, as well as to the Access and Benefitsharing Clearing-House.188
A permit or its equivalent issued at the time of access to genetic resources
and made available to the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House, is
deemed to be an internationally recognized certificate of compliance.189
As such, it would serve as evidence that the genetic resource which it
covers was accessed in accordance with prior informed consent and that
mutually agreed terms had been established.190 For this purpose, the certificate
must include certain basic information specified in the Protocol.191
h. Dispute Settlement
The Parties are required to encourage providers and users of genetic
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge to incorporate dispute
settlement provisions in their contracts including jurisdiction, applicable
law and/or options for alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation or
arbitration.192 The Parties should also provide opportunities for legal
recourse where disputes arise under such agreements,193 and take effective
measures regarding access to justice and the utilization of mechanisms
regarding mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and
arbitral awards.194

187. Id. art. 17(1)(a)(ii).
188. Id. art. 17(1)(a)(iii).
189. Id. art. 17(2).
190. Id. art. 17(3).
191. The information that must be provided in the certificate include:
(a) issuing authority; (b) date of issuance; (c) the provider; (d) unique identifier
of the certificate; (e) the person or entity to whom prior informed consent was
granted; (f) subject-matter or genetic resources covered by the certificate; (g)
confirmation that mutually agreed terms were established; (h) confirmation that
prior informed consent was obtained; and (i) commercial and/or non-commercial
use.
Id. art. 17(4).
192. Id. art. 18(1).
193. Id. art. 18(2).
194. Id. art. 18(3).
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2. Assessment of the Nagoya Protocol
The Nagoya Protocol not only addresses familiar themes in the CBD
and Bonn Guidelines, but has significantly enhanced the scheme of
protection available under those themes and also introduced new ones. As
described earlier, the Bonn Guidelines contain provisions on national
focal points,195 competent authorities,196 and responsibilities of contracting
parties, users, and participation of stakeholders.197 The Bonn Guidelines
also elaborate on specific steps in the access and benefit sharing process
including the identification of the relevant steps,198 prior informed consent,199
mutually agreed terms,200 benefit sharing201 and national monitoring and
reporting requirements.202 The survey of the Nagoya Protocol reveals that
it deals with all these matters as well and introduces new themes such as
the global multilateral benefit sharing mechanism, 203 transboundary
cooperation, 204 the need for compliance with domestic legislation on
access and benefit sharing,205 and financial mechanism and resources.206
Through the improvements on the themes of the Bonn Guidelines and
the introduction of other themes, the Nagoya Protocol has responded quite
effectively to criticisms of the Bonn Guidelines noted above.207 For example,
unlike the Bonn Guidelines, which were to be applied on a voluntary
basis,208 the Nagoya Protocol is intended to impose binding and enforceable
obligations on States. The Nagoya Protocol is a treaty the provisions of
which are considered to be enforceable by and against States that ratify or
accede to it.209 In terms of style, the Nagoya Protocol refers extensively

195. See, e.g., Bonn Guidelines, supra note 18, § 13.
196. Id. §14–15.
197. Id. § 16.
198. Id. § 23.
199. Id. § 24–40.
200. Id. § 41–44.
201. Id. § 45–50.
202. Id. § 55–58.
203. See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 19; art. 10.
204. See id. art. 11.
205. Id. arts. 15, 16.
206. Id. art. 25.
207. See Kuruk, Mutual Recognition Agreements, supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
208. See Bonn Guidelines, supra note 18, § 7.
209. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.”).
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to the word “shall” in stating the responsibilities of States,210 and employs
to much lesser degree, terms common to the Bonn Guidelines such as
“should,”211 “encourage,”212 “endeavor,”213 etc. In this regard, the obligations
of states under the Nagoya Protocol are mandatory and not exhortatory.
Unlike the Bonn Guidelines, the Nagoya Protocol does not rely exclusively
on a contract model for the protection of genetic resources and associated
traditional knowledge, but imposes commitments on States with regard to
such protection. For example, States are required to adopt laws providing
for legal certainty and transparency in their access and benefit sharing
laws, to make available information on how to apply for prior informed
consent and to ensure that decisions regarding access are made in a costeffective manner and within a reasonable period of time.214 The provisions
regarding proof of evidence of access to genetic resources; procedures to
verify the establishment of mutually agreed terms;215 involvement of
stakeholders in the negotiation and approval process; review of mutually
agreed terms by national competent authorities;216 public disclosure of
agreements; and domestic enforcement mechanisms217—all respond to and
mitigate to a significant degree, the problems of a contractually based
regime.218
Dispute settlement provisions in the Nagoya Protocol are also laudable.
By stipulating that contracts must include minimum terms regarding
jurisdiction and applicable law,219 the Protocol ensures that such crucial
terms would not be omitted intentionally or inadvertently to the detriment
of indigenous groups. In addition, by requiring States to facilitate access
to judicial mechanisms for resolving disputes and also enhance the
210. See, e.g., Nagoya Protocol, supra note 19, art. 5 (“Each party shall take legislative,
administrative or policy measures. . . .”) (emphasis added).
211. See, e.g., Bonn Guidelines, supra note 18, § 47 (“Near-term, medium-term, and
long-term benefits should be considered. . . .”) (emphasis added).
212. Id. § 16(a)(i)-(ii) (“Contracting parties . . . should be encouraged to review their
policy, administrative, and legislative measures. . . .”) (emphasis added).
213. Id. § 24 (“[E]ach Contracting Party. . .shall endeavour to create conditions to
facilitate access to genetic resources. . . .”) (emphasis added).
214. See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 19, art. 6.3(a), (c)-(d).
215. See id. art. 6(3).
216. See id. art. 13(1)(c), 13(2).
217. See id. art. 6.
218. See Kuruk, Mutual Recognition Agreements, supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
219. See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 19, art. 18(1)(a)-(b).
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recognition of foreign judicial decisions,220 the Nagoya Protocol has
significantly improved the system of resolving disputes over access and
use of genetic resources.
The most innovative parts of the Nagoya Protocol are the responsibilities
it imposes on both user and provider countries in terms of cooperation in
connection with jurisdictional and enforcement matters and allocation of
benefits. For example, the global multilateral benefit sharing mechanism221
responds to the lack of a mechanism under the Bonn Guidelines for sharing
benefits arising from the use of genetic resources that occur in transboundary
situations. Cooperation by parties where the resources are found in situ
in the territory of more than one Party, 222 would make it difficult for
companies to play one indigenous community against the other in a bid to
obtain the lowest prices for their resources.
The obligation imposed on States to ensure that genetic resources and
associated traditional knowledge are accessed with the prior and informed
consent and that mutually agreed terms223 have been established is especially
useful to cases of biopiracy with international dimensions. It would require
that the Party to whose territory a traditional knowledge user had moved
after departing from the provider country, take appropriate measures to
verify that the relevant consent was obtained, and that mutually agreed
terms were in place before the access to genetic resources. Where this was
not the case, the user Country must make available remedial measures to
address situations of non-compliance and cooperate in cases of alleged
violation of the domestic and access and benefit sharing regulatory
requirements of the provider country.224 Such cooperation will clearly be
useful where a user has moved to the user Country specifically to escape
the jurisdiction of the provider country and therefore avoid liability, or to
avoid paying a judgment against him in the provider country.
Because the benefit-sharing obligation applies not only to the utilization of
genetic resources, but also to subsequent applications and commercialization,225
it will be useful where a person acquires intellectual property rights in a
Contracting State derived from traditional knowledge related genetic
resources obtained in another Contracting State, but does not share the

220. See id. art. 18(3).
221. See id. art. 10.
222. See id. art. 11.
223. See, e.g., id. art. 15.
224. See id. art. 15(2)-(3), 16(2)-(3).
225. Cf. id. art. 3 (“This Protocol shall apply to genetic resources within the scope
of Article 15 of the Convention and to the benefits arising from the utilization of such
resources….”).
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royalties with the Provider Contracting State and relevant indigenous groups.
Under those circumstances, the user Country where the intellectual property
rights are obtained will be required to take remedial steps to en sure
compliance with the access and benefit sharing laws of the source
Country.226
Finally, the clearinghouse mechanism 227 is a useful depositary for
information relevant to the implementation of the Protocol, which could
be resorted to identify the types of genetic resources or associated traditional
knowledge in Contracting States. Such information could be referred to
in biopiracy litigation to show that patents derived from genetic resources
or associated traditional knowledge did not meet prior art intellectual property
criteria on account of well-known documented uses already found in the
database of the clearinghouse mechanism prior to the issuance of the
patents, and should therefore be invalidated.
While the Nagoya Protocol is quite comprehensive in terms of the scope
of its provisions on access to and benefit sharing of traditional knowledge
and genetic resources, it does not deal directly with an important issue
relevant to biopiracy cases. Specifically, the need to ensure that at the
time of examination of a patent application, the authorities have access to
information that may indicate whether the subject-matter of a patent
application was based on or derived from use of traditional knowledge or
genetic resources. The mechanisms developed under the Nagoya Protocol
such as the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing House, national focal
points, competent authorities and checkpoints constitute valuable sources
of information regarding the different types of genetic resources and how
they are accessed, but the information available through those mechanisms
are unlikely to be sought by the examining authority until there is a reason
for it. While such grounds invariably exist after a patent has already been
granted and was being challenged, there would appear to be no need for
such contacts before the patent grant.
A logical and feasible way to make the information relevant at the time
of processing the patent application is to require the applicant to indicate
any use of traditional knowledge or genetic resources in developing the

226. See, e.g., id. art. 16(2) (“Each Party shall take appropriate, effective, and
proportionate measures to address situations of non-compliance with measures adopted in
accordance with paragraph 1….”).
227. See id. art. 14.

35

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2016 2:02 PM

subject matter of its claims. This information could be relied on by the
examining authority to conduct additional investigation with the relevant
entities about the use, if necessary, or by the relevant rights holders, who
could then oppose the patent application. These concerns could have been
tackled under the Nagoya Protocol through a provision calling on Contracting
Parties, with or without making changes to their intellectual property law,
to adopt administrative rules requiring patent applicants to simply check
a box in a questionnaire during the patent application process, verifying
whether or not a claimed invention was based on or derived from traditional
knowledge or genetic resources.
D. The FAO Plants Treaty
In November 2001, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
adopted the Plants Treaty to provide for the “conservation and sustainable
use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with
the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and
food security.”228 The FAO Plants Treaty contains provisions regarding
the conservation, exploration, collection, evaluation and documentation
of plant genetic resources,229 and calls upon Parties to adopt policy and
legal measures to promote the sustainable use of plant genetic resources.230
The FAO Plants Treaty provides for Farmers Rights in recognition of
“the enormous contribution that farmers of all regions of the world,
particularly those in the centres of origin and crop diversity, have made
and will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture
production throughout the world.”231 However, responsibility for realizing
Farmers Rights is imposed on national governments who are to protect
such rights “in accordance with their needs and priorities” and subject to
national legislation.232
Farmers Rights recognized under the instrument include the “protection
of traditional knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture” and the right to “equitably participate in sharing benefits arising
from the utilization of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture” as
well as the right to “participate in making decisions, at the national level,
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
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on matters related to the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture.”233
The FAO Plants Treaty acknowledges “the sovereign rights of States
over their own plant genetic resources for food and agriculture [and that]
the authority to determine access to those resources rests with national
governments and is subject to national legislation.”234 In exercise of such
rights, parties to the FAO Plants Treaty are called upon to “agree to establish
a multilateral system, which is efficient, effective, and transparent, both
to facilitate access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and
to share, in a fair and equitable way, the benefits arising from the utilization
of these resources, on a complementary and mutually reinforcing basis.”235
The multilateral system referred to includes plant genetic resour ces
identified in an annex to the FAO Plants Treaty and is subject to review.236
Access to plant genetic resources is to be facilitated under specific conditions
laid down in the FAO Plants Treaty.237 Benefits accruing from such access

233. Id. art. 9.2(a)-(c).
234. Id. art. 10.1.
235. Id. art. 10.2.
236. Id. art. 11.4.
237. The conditions for access are spelt out as follows:
(a) Access shall be provided solely for the purpose of utilization and conservation in
research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, provided that such
purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical and/or other non-food/feed
industrial uses. In the case of multiple-use crops (food and non-food), their
importance for food security should be the determinant for their inclusion in the
Multilateral System and availability for facilitated access; (b) Access shall be
accorded expeditiously, without the need to track individual accessions and free
of charge, or, when a fee is charged, it shall not exceed the minimal cost
involved; (c) All available passport data and, subject to applicable law, any other
associated available non-confidential descriptive information, shall be made
available with the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture provided;
(d)[Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit
the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, [or
their genetic parts or components,] [in the form] received from the Multilateral
System); (e) Access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture under
development, including material being developed by farmers, shall be at the
discretion of its developer, during the period of its development; (f) Access to
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture protected by intellectual and
other property rights shall be consistent with relevant international agreements,
and with relevant national laws; (g) Plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture accessed under the Multilateral System and conserved shall continue
to be available to the Multilateral System by the recipients of those plant genetic
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are to be shared “fairly and equitably” through exchange of information,238
access to and transfer of technology,239 capacity-building,240 and the sharing
of monetary benefits and other benefits from commercialization.241
Although some provisions in the instrument refer to intellectual property
rights, none of them state an obligation to disclose in patent applications242
the source or origin of plant genetic resources that may be relevant to the
subject matter of the application.
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE SOURCE OR ORIGIN OF
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND GENETIC
RESOURCES AS A POLICY RESPONSE
A. Origins of the Obligation to Disclose
1. Acknowledgement of Source of Folklore
Early references to the disclosure requirement in international instruments
on traditional knowledge can be found in WIPO’s Model Provisions on
National Laws on Folklore243 adopted in 1982 (1982 WIPO Model Provisions);
and the Draft Treaty for the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against
Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (1984 WIPO Draft
Treaty).244 Under the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, protection is to be

resources for food and agriculture, under the terms of this Undertaking; (h)
Without prejudice to the other provisions under this Article, the Contracting
Parties agree that access to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture found
in in situ conditions will be provided according to national legislation. . . .
Id. art. 12.3.
238. Id. art. 13.2(a).
239. Id. art. 13.2(b).
240. Id. art. 13.2(c).
241. Id. art. 13.2(b).
242. See, e.g., id. art. 12(d)-(e).
243. See generally United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
[UNESCO] and World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Model Provisions for
National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation
and Other Prejudicial Actions (1985), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/unesco/
unesco001en.pdf [hereinafter WIPO Model Provisions].
244. See generally Secretariat of the World Intellectual Property Organization
[WIPO], Final Report on National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions
of Folklore, Draft Treaty for the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions, Annex IV, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/10 (Mar. 25,
2002) [hereinafter WIPO Draft Treaty].
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extended to folklore whether it is expressed verbally,245 musically,246 by
action,247 or in tangible form.248 Where protected expressions of folklore
are to be used both with gainful intent and outside their traditional or customary
context,249 prior approval must be obtained from a competent authority250
designated as the main repository of rights to folklore.251 Applications to
use an expression of folklore must be made in writing to the authority252
which may impose fees for such use with the understanding that the revenues
so collected would be used to promote or safeguard national folklore.253
Significantly, the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions require that:
In all printed publications, and in connection with any communications to the
public of any identifiable expression of folklore, its source shall be indicated in
an appropriate manner by mentioning the community and/or geographic place
from where the expression utilized has been derived.254

However, the requirement to acknowledge the source of folklore does not
apply to creations of original works inspired by expressions of folklore or
to incidental uses of expressions of folklore.255
The 1982 WIPO Model Provisions allow criminal penalties to be
imposed for: failing to obtain the required written consent prior to use of
protected folklore;256 failing to acknowledge the source of folklore;257
misrepresenting the origin of expressions of folklore;258 and distorting
245. WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, art. 2, § 2(i).
246. Id. § 2(ii). Examples of protected musical expressions include folk songs and
instrumental music.
247. Id. § 2(iii). Examples of protected expressions of action include folk dances,
plays and artistic forms or rituals, whether or not reduced in material form.
248. Id. § 2(iv). This would include productions of folk art such as drawings,
paintings, carvings, sculptures, pottery, terracotta, mosaic, metal ware, jewelry, basket weaving,
needlework, textiles, carpets, costumes, musical instruments and architectural forms.
249. Id. § 3. This would apply to “(i) any publication, reproduction and distribution
of copies of expressions of folklore; (ii) any public recitation or performance, any transmission
by wireless means or wire, and any other form of communication to the public, of expressions
of folklore.”
250. Id.
251. Id. § 11.
252. Id. § 10(1).
253. Id. § 10(2).
254. Id. § 5.
255. Id. § 5(2).
256. Id. § 6(2).
257. Id. § 6(1).
258. Id. § 6(3).
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works of folklore in any manner considered prejudicial to the honor,
dignity or cultural interests of the community from which it originates.259
In addition, objects made in violation of the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions
and any profits made therefrom can be seized.260 These remedies may be
imposed along with damages and other civil remedies.261
After promulgating the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, the Committee
of Experts proceeded to prepare the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty,262 which
closely tracks the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions in terms of definition of
subject-matter,263 remedies for unauthorized use264 and acknowledgement
of the sources of folklore.265 Indeed, the wording of the disclosure principle
differs only slightly from the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions as follows.
In all printed publications, and in connection with any communications to the
public of any identifiable expression of folklore, its source shall be indicated in
an appropriate manner by mentioning the community and/or geographic place in
which it has originated.266

Under 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, each contracting state would designate
a competent authority to administer the protection of expressions of folklore
within the state. This authority could request that the other states protect
expressions originating in the contracting states’ own territory267 and the
written permission of that authority would be required prior to permitting
commercial uses268 of folklore in other contracting states. To facilitate the
implementation of this provision, the state-appointed authority is required
to provide information pertaining to the main characteristics and the source
of expressions of folklore originating in its territory.269 The request to use
259. Id. § 6(4).
260. Id. § 7.
261. Id. § 8.
262. See WIPO Draft Treaty, supra note 244.
263. See id. art. 1.
264. For example, criminal penalties, seizure and damages relief are also contained
in Articles 8, 9 and 10 of each instrument. However, unlike the model provisions, the draft
treaty would impose civil penalties for any use of folklore that “causes economic harm to
the State or community in which the utilized expression of folklore has originated.” Id.
art 10.
265. Id. art. 7.
266. Id. art. 7(1).
267. Id. art. 3(1).
268. Permission would be required in connection with the publication, reproduction,
distribution or importation, for purpose of distribution to the public, of reproductions or
recordings of recitations or performances of expressions of folklore; or for the public
recitation or performance of expressions of folklore, as well as any broadcast of expressions of
folklore. See id. art. 4(1).
269. Id. art. 4(2).
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an expression of folklore would be made to the competent authority in the
state in which the expression of folklore originates.270 With few exceptions,
authorization is expected to be automatic and expeditious,271 but may be
conditioned on the payment of adequate compensation, which would be
fixed by the competent authority in the absence of agreement.
However, due to opposition from some member states the 1984 WIPO
Draft Treaty was never finalized for adoption and consequently lacks legal
significance.272
2. Access and Benefit Sharing Considerations
In the context of genetic resources, however, the obligation to disclose
can be traced to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). As noted
earlier, the CBD provides that access to genetic resources shall be “on
mutually agreed terms”273 and subject to the prior informed consent of the
Contracting State providing such resources.274 Each Contracting Party is
required “to respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”275
and also “encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices.”276 However,
there is no explicit reference to a disclosure requirement in the CBD.
In furtherance of the goals of the CBD, the Conference of the Parties to
the CBD (COP) adopted the Bonn Guidelines to “serve as inputs when
developing and drafting legislative, administrative or policy measures on
access and benefit- sharing with particular reference to provisions” of the
CBD.277 Significantly, the Bonn Guidelines call on Parties and Governments
to “encourage the disclosure of the country of origin of the genetic resources
and of the origin of traditional knowledge innovations and practices in

270. Id. art. 5(1).
271. A request may be denied where the intended use would be prejudicial to the
honor or dignity of the originating country or community. The competent authority is
required to justify in writing, any decision it has taken to denying a request. Id. art. 5(2).
272. Kuruk, Protecting Folklore, supra note 16, at 818–19.
273. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 17, art. 15(4).
274. Id. art. 15(5).
275. Id. art. 8.
276. Id.
277. Bonn Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.
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applications for intellectual property rights.”278 The COP decision adopting
the Bonn Guidelines elaborates on this by calling for such disclosure
where the subject matter of the patent application concerns or makes use
of genetic resources279 or traditional knowledge, innovations and practices
of indigenous and local communities relevant for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity.280 As justification, the COP notes
that disclosure would make “a possible contribution to tracking compliance
with prior informed consent and the mutually agreed terms on which
access to those resources was granted.”281
Like the Bonn Guidelines, the Nagoya Protocol addresses the question
of access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
arising from their utilization and in this context, imposes on States various
undertakings including rules regarding prior informed consent, mutually
agreed terms, benefit sharing, and trans-boundary cooperation. The Nagoya
Protocol set specific obligations to support compliance with the domestic
legislation or regulatory requirements of countries providing genetic resources
and contractual obligations reflected in mutually agreed terms.282 Thus, it
sought to transform into binding commitments the principles first articulated
in the CBD, and later the Bonn Guidelines. However, while the Bonn
Guidelines contain explicit provisions on the disclosure requirement in the
context of the implementation of the principles, the Nagoya Protocol
omits a similar reference, perhaps suggestive of difficulties with reaching
an agreement on the disclosure requirement during negotiations leading
up to the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol.
3. Incorporating a Disclosure Requirement Under Patent Laws
To complement the access and benefit-sharing regime, and prevent
biopiracy or facilitate the prosecution of biopiracy cases, governments and
indigenous groups have called for patent laws to be amended to include a
disclosure requirement. For example, at the fourth session of the Working
Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in May 2003, Switzerland

278. Id. § 16(d)(ii).
279. The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the Implementation of Access and
Benefit Sharing Arrangements, Decision VI/24/C, ¶ 1, in Report of the Sixth Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Conference of
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20
(May 27, 2002) [hereinafter COP Decision VI/24/C].
280. Id. ¶ 2.
281. Id. ¶ 1.
282. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 19, Introduction.
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introduced proposals regarding the declaration of the source of genetic
resources and traditional knowledge in patent applications283 which it
repeated at other fora including sessions of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working
Group on Access and Benefit Sharing of the CBD,284 the WTO TRIPS
Council,285 WIPO’s Ad-Hoc Intergovernmental Meeting on Genetic
Resources and Disclosure Requirements,286 and WIPO’s Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore.287
In its proposals, Switzerland identified transparency, traceability, technical
prior art, and mutual trust as policy specific objectives underlying the
disclosure requirement.288 It explained that the disclosure of source of
traditional knowledge “would increase transparency in access and benefit
sharing with regard to genetic resources and traditional knowledge”289 and
also “allow the providers of genetic resources and traditional knowledge
to keep track of the use of their resources or knowledge in research and
development resulting in patentable inventions.”290 Furthermore, such

283. WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Proposals
by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Reso urces and
Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/4/13 (May 5,
2003).
284. Convention on Biological Diversity, Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the
Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent
Applications, U.N Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/3/INF/7 (Jan. 31, 2005).
285. WTO, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Article 27.3(b), The Relationship Between the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Communication from
Switzerland, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/400/Rev.1 (June 18, 2003).
286. WIPO, Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Meeting on Genetic Resources and
Disclosure Requirements, Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the
Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, WIPO
Doc. WIPO/IP/GR/05/INF/4 (May 19, 2005).
287. WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Proposals by Switzerland Regarding
Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent
Applications, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/20/INF/10 (Oct. 17, 2011).
288. WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the
Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent
Applications ¶ 12, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/10 (June 6, 2007) [hereinafter Swiss
Proposals].
289. Id. ¶ 12(a).
290. Id. ¶ 12(b).
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disclosure would be useful to patent examiners and judges in the determination
of the prior art, as it “would simplify searching the databases on traditional
knowledge that are increasingly being established at the local, regional
and national level.” 291 Moreover, the disclosure of the source would
enhance mutual trust among stakeholders who may be providers and/or
users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, including developing
and developed countries, indigenous and local communities, private companies
and research institutions.”292 This will not only deepen “mutual trust in
the North—South—relationship,” but also “strengthen the mutual
supportiveness between the access and benefit sharing system and the
patent system.”293
Similarly, during discussions in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 2003 regarding a review of Article 27.3(b) of the Agreement on the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement),294
a group of countries including Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Peru,
Thailand, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe called for Article 29 of the
TRIPS Agreement295 to be amended to provide that an applicant for a
patent relating to biological materials or to traditional knowledge provide,
as a condition of patent rights, (i) the disclosure of the source and country
of the biological resource and traditional knowledge used in the invention;
(ii) evidence of prior informed consent through approval of authorities
under the relevant national regime; and (iii) evidence of fair and equitable
benefit sharing under the relevant national regime.296

291. Id. ¶ 12(c).
292. Id. ¶ 12(d).
293. Id.
294. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art.
27.3(b), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Under Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement on
patentable subject matter, it is provided that: “Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The provisions
of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement.”
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), art. 27.3(b),
available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.
295. TRIPS Agreement, art. 29.
296. TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, supra note 21, ¶ 1.
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Proponents of the disclosure requirement at the WTO297 contended that
such disclosure would promote the objectives of the patent system by
reducing instances of bad patents; enabling patent examiners to ascertain
more effectively the “inventive” step claimed in a particular patent application;
and enhancing the ability of countries to track down and challenge instances
of bad patents.298 However, these claims were strenuously opposed by the
U.S., which argued that the “most effective” means to achieving the
international community’s goals regarding access, benefit sharing and the
prevention of the issuance of erroneously issued patents is rather “through
tailored, national solutions to meet practical concerns and actual needs . . .
[and that the] introduction of a new patent disclosure would not achieve
those important objectives but may have significant negative consequences.”299
Specifically, the US pointed out that a new disclosure requirement
would not, per se, ensure that benefits are equitably shared, as “such a
requirement would merely convey the information requested but have no
mechanism to transfer benefits between parties.”300 On the matter of
preventing erroneously granted patents, the US noted as well that “information
indicating country of origin, ex situ collection sites, etc., would do little to
ensure ascertainment of appropriate inventorship, novelty or inventive
step, because such information does not generally address the considerations
underlying these requirements, such as acts of invention or the state of the
relevant art.”301 A negative consequence of the disclosure requirement,
“particularly where the sanctions for non-compliance include invalidation
of a patent,” the U.S. argued, would be the creation of “a ‘cloud’ of
uncertainty over the patent right by opening a new avenue for litigation
and other uncertainties that would undermine the role of the patent system
in promoting innovation and technological development.”302 Moreover,

297. For an analysis of the debate surrounding the disclosure requirement, see
generally, Nuno Pires Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications without Infringing the TRIPS
Agreement: The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 371–401 (2000).
298. TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, supra note 21, ¶ 7.
299. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Article
27.3(b), The Relationship Between the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Communication from the US, ¶ 6,
WTO Doc. IP/C/W/434 (Nov. 6, 2004).
300. Id. ¶ 9.
301. Id. ¶ 13.
302. Id. ¶ 14.

45

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

10/7/2016 2:02 PM

the patent disclosure requirement would impose “significant administrative
burdens for the patent offices of members that would in turn create additional
costs, particularly with respect to those requirements that demand compliance
with foreign laws.”303
Some developing countries countered the arguments of the United States
regarding uncertainties,304 administrative costs,305 monitoring difficulties306
and relevance to patent protection.307 While not discounting the usefulness
of well-functioning national systems, those countries stressed the need for
an international solution to complement the national systems.308 According
to them, both national and international mechanisms are critical to provide
the cooperation required to tackle cases of biopiracy with significant
international dimensions. They also noted that the disclosure requirement

303. Id. ¶ 15.
304. Brazil and India argue that rather than create uncertainties regarding patent
rights, the establishment of clear internationally agreed rules on disclosure, prior informed
consent and benefit sharing would rather create certainties and facilitate acc ess by
researchers biological resources and/or traditional knowledge which the United States has
identified to be of significance to researchers and bio-prospectors that use the patent
system. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The
Relationship Between the Trips Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, Technical Observations on Issues
Raised in a Communication by the United States (IP/C/W/434), Submission from Brazil
and India, ¶ 18, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/443 (Mar. 18, 2005).
305. As to the fear of increased administrative costs, Brazil and India denied that the
expectation on applicants under the disclosure requirement to employ all reasonable
measures to determine the country of origin and source of the material “would in any way
be burdensome . . . [rather . . . such a burden would generally be subsumed in, or at least not
be more burdensome than, the usual burden befalling the patent applicant to make out a
case for his claims under current patent procedures and practices.” See id. ¶ 19.
306. On the issue of monitoring, it was pointed out that “given the enormous number
of patents granted worldwide, the disclosure requirement will facilitate the monitoring of
those patents by the owners of the biological material and associated traditional knowledge
with a view to check whether prior informed consent and benefit sharing arrangements are
being adhered to by the patent owners upon commercialization.” See id. ¶ 13.
307. Contrary to the assertions of the United States, Brazil and India contended that
the disclosure requirement would be relevant in determining the existence of prior art,
inventorship or scope of the patent “to the extent that the disclosed information will help
determine whether the biological resources and/or traditional knowledge was used: to form
part of the claimed invention; during the process of developing the claimed inventions; as
a necessary prerequisite for the development of the invention; to facilitate the development
of the invention; and/or as necessary background material and/or information for the
development of the invention.” See id. ¶ 17.
308. Brazil and India insisted that such an approach “would be akin to arguing that
in order to ensure the effective operation of the patent system, for example, only national
patent laws are needed and not international agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement.”
See id. ¶ 6.
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was not unique, but was similar to disclosure requirements in patent laws
“including disclosure of best mode, and in other jurisdictions such as the
United States, a requirement to disclose all information material to
patentability.” 309 In this sense, therefore, the proposed requirement was
“no different from those obligations the fulfillment of which has not been
shown to impose any unnecessary burden on applicants.”310
However, nothing concrete came out of the debate at the WTO and the
TRIPS Agreement was not amended to include the disclosure requirement.
Some members considered WIPO to be a more appropriate forum to
develop solutions to the problem of biopiracy and urged that the debate
be conducted there instead.311
B. Implications of the Disclosure Requirement
A number of issues arise from the disclosure requirement which require
closer examination, namely, the nature of the relationship that must exist
between a claimed patent invention and traditional knowledge to trigger
disclosure; the legal principles upon which the disclosure requirement
would be based; the scope of duties imposed on the patent applicant; and
the consequences of failure to comply with the requirement.
1. Triggers
References in the literature to the disclosure requirement reveal varying
triggers.312 For example, the COP of the CBD refers to disclosure requirements
concerning material that is “utilized in the development of the claimed
inventions”313 or that is simply “utilized in the claimed inventions.”314 The
COP would encourage disclosure where in its development “the subject
matter of the application concerns or makes use of genetic resources”315

309. Id. ¶ 20.
310. Id.
311. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, Note by the
Secretariat: The Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore; Summary of Issues
Raised and Points Made, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/370/Rev.1 (Mar. 9, 2006), ¶ 10.
312. WIPO Technical Study on Patent Disclosure Requirements Related to Genetic
Resources, and Traditional Knowledge (2004) at 3 [hereinafter WIPO Tech. Study].
313. COP Decision VI/24/C, supra note 279, at 12.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 11.
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or “[traditional] knowledge.”316 On their part, the Bonn Guidelines note,
as a national monitoring mechanism, the possibility of using “applications
for patents and other intellectual property rights relating to the material
supplied.”317
In this context, regional and national instruments make references to
certain related concepts such as: (a) “an invention is based on biological
material of plant or animal origin or if it uses such material;”318 (b) “obtained
or developed through an access activities;”319 c) products or processes
whose protection is being requested was obtained or developed on the basis
of the knowledge originating in any one of the Member Countries;’320 (d)
“a process or product obtained using samples or components of the genetic
heritage;”321 (e) “innovations involving elements of biodiversity;”322 and
(f) “biological material . . . when used in an invention” and “biological
material used for the invention.”323
These examples indicate a range of possible linkages between traditional
knowledge and a patented invention, such as whether the relationship was
necessary or contingent, and whether traditional knowledge was actually
part of the process that led to the invention.324 The contributions of traditional
knowledge to the inventiveness reflected in the product or process patent
could range from first, a general pointer to the line of research that led to
the invention;325 second a more direct pointer to the invention;326 third,

316. Id.
317. Bonn Guidelines, supra note 18, ¶ 55(c).
318. Recital 27 of Directive 98/44/EC of the Eur. Parl. and of the Council of 6 July
1998 on the Legal Prot. of Biological Inventions, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/8, 1998 O.J. (L
213/15).
319. Article 35 of the Andean Cmty. Decision 391 of 2 July 1996 on Access to
Genetic Res., WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/8 at ¶ 17(a).
320. SILKE VON LEWINSKI. INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 246
(Silke von Lewinkski ed., 2nd ed. 2008).
321. Article 31 of Brazilian Provisional Measure No. 2186-16, Aug. 23, 2001; see
also WIPO/GRTKF/IC/INF/2.
322. L. 7,788. 1988, art. 81, BIODIVERSITY LAW. (COSTA RICA).
323. Patent (Amendment) Act, 1924, No. 38, Leg. Dep., 2002 (India) at § 10(4),
25(1).
324. Comment On Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, Draft Technical Study on Disclosure Requirements Related to
Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, ¶ 98, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/1 (May 2,
2003), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_5/wipo_grtkf_ic_5_10.pdf
[hereinafter Draft Tech. Study].
325. Id. ¶ 100.
326. Traditional knowledge that a plant has certain medicinal properties may lead
researchers to explore other possible medicinal properties of active compounds in the
plant. Id.
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direct contributions to the inventive concept;327 or fourth, a component of
the inventive concept itself.328 In each of these cases, while the invention
may derive from the access to the traditional knowledge, the nature of the
obligation to disclose could differ considerably. Thus, in the first case,
the traditional knowledge could be “used as part of the descriptive background
to the invention”; in the second case, “form part of prior art that may be
caught by obligations to disclose material prior art”;329 in the third case, it
might be considered to be either “relevant prior art or arguably form part
of the invention itself”; and, in the last case, it might form “part of the
invention as claimed, leading to an obligation to name the [traditional
knowledge] holder as an inventor or co-inventor.”330
2. Legal Bases
In general, there are two forms of the disclosure requirement: those that
directly use, or adapt and extend existing patent law mechanisms, and
those that are intended to be distinct new requirements and are based on
separate legal principles.331 Disclosure requirements of the first type are
based on existing disclosure obligations in patent law such as disclosure
necessary to enable the invention to be carried out, disclosure of the best
mode or preferred embodiment of the invention, disclosure of the actual
inventor or inventors, and disclosure of known prior art.332 Complementing
the patent related disclosure rules are legislative or judicial doctrines
which seek to remedy cases where patents may have been obtained through
fraudulent behavior,333 including the equitable concepts of “ clean hands,”
fraudulent procurement and misappropriation.334

327. Traditional knowledge that a certain plant extract was effective in treating skin
infections may have led researchers to conclude that active compounds in the plant were
effective antibiotics. Id.
328. A traditional knowledge holder may have communicated to a researcher a new
or undisclosed medicinal property of a plant extract, when this property is central to the
invention as claimed. Id.
329. WIPO Tech. Study, supra note 312, ¶ 100.
330. Id.
331. Id. ¶ 111.
332. Id.
333. Id. ¶ 125.
334. Id. ¶ 124.
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However, other proposals on the disclosure requirement appear to be
directed more clearly towards the implementation of non-patent laws and
obligations. In the latter group of cases, the patent process is used merely
as a means of giving effect to obligations under distinct legal or ethical
systems, such as compliance with access regulations that may also require
prior informed consent and the equitable sharing of benefits.335 Because
the laws on access and benefit sharing are premised on contractual
arrangements between the owners and users of traditional knowledge,
such contracts are sometimes viewed as underlying considerations in
enforcing the disclosure requirement.336
3. Scope of the Obligation
It is also useful to assess what the applicant must do to meet the obligation
to disclose.337 For example, would the applicant be required to investigate
and determine the source of relevant traditional knowledge and disclose it
or merely use reasonable efforts or best endeavors to determine the
source? Related to this issue is the burden of proof, or the degree to which
an application or granted patent is deemed prima facie to be compliant
with a disclosure requirement.338 For example, would this require proof
by the applicant, where applicable, that traditional knowledge was accessed
in compliance with the laws of the source country, or would that be
assumed to be case in the absence of evidence to the contrary? Some
proposals distinguish between primary sources, such as states providing
genetic resources and indigenous and local communities on the one hand,
and secondary sources including ex-situ collections and local communities.339
Under one approach, applicants “must declare the primary source to fulfill
the requirement if they have information about the primary source”340 and
declare the secondary source only if they have no information about the
primary source.341

335. Id. ¶ 115.
336. Id. ¶ 118, 129.
337. Id. ¶ 136
338. Id. ¶ 137.
339. WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Proposals
by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, ¶ 20, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/8/7 (2006).
340. Id. ¶ 21.
341. As the Swiss Proposals explain:
[I]f the patent applicant knows that the source of the genetic resource is the
Contracting Party providing this resource, this Contracting State must be disclosed
as the source; in contrast, if the applicant received the genetic resource from a
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4. Sanctions
Potential consequences of failure to meet requirements to disclose
certain information in a patent application may include the narrowing or
invalidation of patent claims; administrative and criminal penalties; denial
of the application; and invalidation or unenforceability of the patent after
its grant.342 However, the sanctions applied in a given case may depend
on the legal basis of the disclosure requirement, the stage reached in the
processing of the patent, the steps taken to remedy the failure, the restrictions
that may apply after the issuance of the patent, the considerations as to
whether the failure was unintentional or done with fraudulent intent, and
the reliance on the undisclosed material for support.343 Under the Swiss
proposals, sanctions contemplated under the Patent Cooperation Treaty
and the Patent Law Treaty would also apply to failure to declare the source
or wrongful declaration of the source of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge in patent applications.344 Thus non-compliance during the
processing of the application could result in a rejection of the application,345
but non-compliance after a patent grant will not lead to the revocation of
the patent except in cases involving fraudulent intent.346
V. WIPO’S WORK PROGRAM ON THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT
A. Emerging Strategy
1. WIPO’S Mandate on Intellectual Property
The most sustained and comprehensive work to date on the disclosure
principle has been carried out by WIPO, which is generally acknowledged
to be the best forum to tackle issues of biopiracy in light of its global

Id.

botanical garden, but does not know the Contracting Party providing the genetic
resource, the botanical garden must be disclosed as the source.

342. Draft Tech. Study, supra note 324, at ¶ 149.
343. Id. ¶ 154.
344. WIPO, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Proposals
by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, ¶ 7, WIPO Doc. PCT/R/WG/8/7 (Apr. 21,
2006).
345. Id. ¶ 26.
346. Id. ¶ 27.
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mandate. Indeed, WIPO was established on July 14, 1967347 to “promote
the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation
among States and . . . in collaboration with any other international organization,”
and also to “ensure administrative cooperation among the Unions.”348
To attain these objectives, WIPO is mandated to “promote the development
of measures designed to facilitate the efficient protection of intellectual
property throughout the world and to harmonize national legislation in this
field.”349 It is also authorized to “encourage the conclusion of international
agreements designed to promote the protection of intellectual property,”350
offer legal-technical assistance to States351 and “assemble and disseminate
information concerning the protection of intellectual property, carry out
and promote studies in this field, and publish the results of such studies.”352
Finally, it is required to “maintain services facilitating the international
protection of intellectual property and . . . provide for registration in this
field and the publication of the data concerning the registrations.”353
2. Establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee
In November 1997, the new Director-General of WIPO, Dr. Kamil
Idris, established the Global Intellectual Property Issues Division (GIPID)
to enable WIPO to “remain at the forefront of global IP developments by
responding to . . . challenges facing the IP system in a rapidly changing
world.”354 One of the main tasks of the GIPID was “to identify and explore
the intellectual property needs and expectations of new beneficiaries,
including the holders of indigenous knowledge and innovations, in order

347. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 1,
(Sept. 28 1979), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/convention/trt_convention_
001en.pdf. [hereinafter WIPO Convention]. Membership in WIPO is open to any State
that is a member of any of the Unions, or the United Nations or a party to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. It is managed by a Secretariat headed by a Director
General, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Id. arts. 5, 9 and 10.
348. Id. art. 3. The term “Unions” refers to groups of countries participating in preexisting major international intellectual property instruments, including the Paris Convention
and the Berne Convention, as well as other international agreements on intellectual
property the administration of which is assumed in the future by WIPO. See id. art. 2(vii).
349. Id. art. 4(i).
350. Id. art. 4(iv).
351. Id. art. 4(v).
352. Id. art. 4(vi).
353. Id. art. 4(vii).
354. Intellectual Property Needs, supra note 1, at 16.
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to promote the contribution of the IP system to their social, cultural and
economic development.”355
To this end, WIPO conducted nine fact-finding missions between June
1998 and November 1999 to twenty-eight countries in the South Pacific,
Southern and Eastern Africa, South Asia, North America, Central America,
West Africa, Arab countries, South America, and the Caribbean.356 WIPO
also organized round tables in July 1998 and November 1999 to facilitate
an “exchange of views among policymakers, indigenous peoples and
other holders of TK on the more effective application of the IP system for
the protection of traditional and indigenous knowledge.”357
In line with the objectives of the newly created GIPID, WIPO’s activities
on genetic resources began in 1998358 when it joined with the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to commission a study on the
role of IP rights in the sharing of benefits arising from the use of biological
resources and associated traditional knowledge.359 Issues related to intellectual
property and genetic resources were also discussed by WIPO at the third
session of the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP) in September
1999 during which Colombia requested the following language to be included
in the proposed Patent Law Treaty:
1.

All industrial property protection shall guarantee the protection of the country’s
biological and genetic heritage. Consequently, the grant of patents or registrations
that relate to elements of that heritage shall be subject to their having been
acquired legally.

2.

Every document shall specify the registration number of the contract affording
access to genetic resources and a copy thereof where the goods or services
for which protection is sought have been manufactured or developed from
genetic resources, or products thereof, of which one of the member countries
is the country of origin.360

The request by Colombia may have marked the first time that the
disclosure requirement was raised in a WIPO forum in the context of
355. Id. at 19.
356. See id. at 16.
357. Id.
358. WIPO, Genetic Resources: Factual Update of International Developments, ¶ 3,
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/11/8(b) (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter Factual Update].
359. Id. ¶ 3.
360. Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement:
The Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371, 377 (2000).
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genetic resources. As an outcome of the meeting, the SCP requested the
WIPO Secretariat to include the issue of protection of biological and
genetic resources on the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of Working
Group on Biotechnological Inventions at which a questionnaire was prepared
to gather information from Member States regarding national protection
of biotechnological inventions, including certain aspects regarding intellectual
property and genetic resources.361
In response to an invitation from the SCP, WIPO organized a Meeting
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources in April 2000 to discuss
intellectual property issues surrounding access to, and in situ preservation
of, genetic resources.362 The meeting resulted in a consensus that:
WIPO should facilitate the continuation of consultations among Member States
in coordination with the other concerned international organizations, through the
conduct of appropriate legal and technical studies, and through the setting up of
an appropriate forum within WIPO for future work. 363

Informal consultations held at WIPO prior to the Diplomatic Conference
for the Adoption of the Patent Law Treaty in May 2000, produced a resolution
that discussions concerning genetic resources would continue at WIPO
but with the format of the discussions to be left to the Director General’s
discretion, in consultation with WIPO Member States.364 Further consultations
were held after the Diplomatic Conference, resulting in a proposal to
establish a distinct body within WIPO to facilitate the discussions on
traditional knowledge.365
Accordingly, at the twenty-sixth session of the WIPO General Assembly
in October 2000, the Member States established the Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC).366 It was agreed that deliberations at the
IGC would proceed on three themes identified during the consultations:
intellectual property issues that arise in the context of (i) access to genetic
resources and benefit sharing; (ii) protection of traditional knowledge,
whether or not associated with those resources; and (iii) the protection of
expressions of folklore.367
361. Factual Update, supra note 358, ¶ 4.
362. Id.
363. Id. ¶ 6.
364. Id. ¶ 7.
365. Id. ¶ 8.
366. See generally WIPO General Assembly, Sept. 25-Oct. 3, 2000, WIPO Doc.WO/
GA/26/10 (Oct. 3, 2000).
367. WIPO, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, ¶ 14, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 25, 2000).
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3. Focus on Genetic Resources and Related Traditional Knowledge
During its first session in May 2001, the IGC identified as possible
elements of a work program on intellectual property and genetic resources,
the development of guide practices, guidelines, and model intellectual
property clauses for contractual agreements on access to genetic resources
and benefit-sharing. These would take into account “the specific nature
and needs of different stakeholders, different genetic resources, and different
transfers within different sectors of genetic resource policy.”368
At its second session, in December 2001, the IGC agreed on a two-step
approach which would entail first, a complete and systematic survey of
intellectual property clauses used in existing contracts, and, second, the
preparation of guide practices or model intellectual property clauses based
on the existing practices and clauses.369 It was agreed that the clauses
would deal only with intellectual property aspects; be non-binding; without
prejudice to, and consistent with, the work of the CBD and FAO; and be
developed with the full and effective participation of all stakeholders, in
particular indigenous and local communities.370 The IGC also discussed
other issues such as disclosure of the origin of genetic resources, prior
informed consent, the sovereignty of states over their genetic resources,
transfer of technology, education and legal assistance to indigenous and
local communities, and the legal status of genetic resources under international
law.371
A few months after the second IGC meeting, the Conference of the
Parties (COP) invited WIPO in April 2002 to:
Prepare a technical study, and to report its findings to the Conference of the
Parties at its seventh meeting, on methods consistent with obligations in treaties
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization for requiring the
disclosure within patent applications of, inter alia: (a) genetic resources utilized
in the development of the claimed inventions; (b) the country of origin of genetic
resources utilized in the claimed inventions; (c) associated traditional knowledge,
innovations and practices utilized in the development of the claimed inventions;
(d) the source of associated traditional knowledge, innovations and practices; and,
(e) evidence of prior informed consent.372

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Factual Update, supra note 358, ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 16.
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The IGC discussed this invitation at its third session, agreed to respond
positively to the CBD’s request and adopted a work schedule to enable
the completion and transmission of the study in time for the seve nth
meeting of the COP.373 Between the IGC’s third and fourth sessions, the
WIPO Secretariat circulated a questionnaire to Member States soliciting
views on national practices relevant to the intellectual property issues
identified for study in the COP’s invitation.374
At its fifth session, the IGC was presented a report, the “Draft Technical
Study on Disclosure Requirements related to Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge,” which had been prepared on the basis of the
responses received from Member States.375 The IGC resolved to submit
the report to the WIPO General Assembly with the recommendation that
it be transmitted as a technical reference document to the Conference of
Parties of the CBD, a recommendation which was later approved and acted
on by the WIPO General Assembly.376
On its part, after receiving the WIPO Report, the COP issued yet another
invitation at its meeting in February 2004 requiring WIPO to:
Examine . . . issues regarding the interrelation of access to genetic resources and
disclosure requirements in intellectual property rights applications, including,
inter alia: (a) options for model provisions on proposed disclosure requirements;
(b) practical options for intellectual property rights application procedures with
regard to the triggers of disclosure requirements; c) options for incentive measures
for applicants; (d) identification of the implications for the functioning of disclosure
requirements in various WIPO administered treaties; (e) intellectual property
related issues raised by a proposed international certificate of origin/source/legal
provenance. . . .377

373. Id. ¶ 22.
374. Id.
375. Id. ¶ 27.
376. Id. The report was transmitted subject to the following understanding:
The attached draft technical study has been prepared to contribute to international
discussion and analysis of this general issue, and to help clarify some of the legal
and policy matters it raises. It has not been prepared to advocate any particular
approach nor to expound a definitive interpretation of any treaty. It is to be
regarded as a technical input to facilitate policy discussion and analysis in the
Convention on Biological Diversity and in other fora, and it should not be
considered a formal paper expressing a policy position on the part of WIPO, its
Secretariat or its Member States.
Id. ¶ 28.
377. Id. ¶ 31.
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During its seventh session, the IGC examined a document dealing with
the question of patent disclosure requirements relating to genetic resources,378
which addressed both the factual background on work within WIPO
concerning the disclosure requirement as well as the existing proposals
for possible further work on the matter.379
4. Authorization to Negotiate Instruments
Following a review of progress made by the IGC with its work program
on traditional knowledge and genetic resources, the WIPO General Assembly
renewed the mandate of the IGC in September 2009380 and authorized it
to “undertake text-based negotiations with the objective of reaching agreement
on a text of an international legal instrument (or instruments) which will
ensure the effective protection of GRs, TK and TCEs.”381 The WIPO
General Assembly directed that the focus of the IGC’s program “build on
the existing work carried out by the Committee and use all WIPO working
documents,”382 including three specific ones, each of which focused on
one of the thematic areas of cultural expressions, traditional knowledge,
and genetic resources.383 They were “to constitute the basis of the Committee’s
work on text-based negotiations.”384 The WIPO General Assembly also
requested the IGC to submit the text (or texts) of an international legal
instrument (or instruments) agreed upon for a decision to be made by the
General Assembly on whether to convene a diplomatic conference to
adopt the instrument(s).385
For the next six years, the IGC continued to deliberate on those documents
during its regular sessions, and even convened some intersessional meetings

378. See generally WIPO, Patent Disclosure Requirements Relating to Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge: Update, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/10 (Oct.
15, 2004).
379. Factual Update, supra note 358, ¶ 38.
380. WIPO General Assembly, Rep. of the Thirty-Eighth (19th Ordinary) Sess.,
Sept. 22-Oct. 1, 2009, ¶ 217, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/38/20 (Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter WIPO
General Assembly Rep., Thirty-Eighth Sess.].
381. Id. ¶ 217(a).
382. Id. ¶ 217(c).
383. See id.
384. Id.
385. Id. ¶ 217(d).
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to expedite the process.386 At its twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sessions,
in February and March 2014 respectively, the IGC developed three texts:
(i) Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources Rev. 2387 (hereinafter referred to as “Consolidated Document
on Genetic Resources”); (ii) The Protection of Traditional Knowledge
Draft Articles Rev. 2388 (hereinafter referred to as “Draft Articles on
Traditional Knowledge”); and (iii) The Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions: Draft Articles Rev. 2389 (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft
Articles on Traditional Cultural Expressions”).
Out of the three texts, only the Consolidated Document on Genetic
Resources and the Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge deal specifically
with the disclosure requirement. They will therefore be the primary focus
of the discussion in the next section, and will be referred to collectively
as “Draft Negotiating Texts.” However, it must be cautioned that many
of the provisions in the instruments are qualified by terms in parentheses,
reflecting proposed additions to or subtractions from the substance of the
texts. The instruments should therefore be read as incomplete in their
current form and constitute works in progress that are subject to further
negotiations to refine and align them as consensus is obtained on key
points in the future.

386. WIPO Secretariat, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, First Intersessional Working
Group, WIPO/GRTKF/IWG/1/2 (July 23, 2010), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo
_grtkf_iwg_1/wipo_grtkf_iwg_1_2_prov.pdf; WIPO Secretariat, Intergovernmental Committee
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
Third Intersessional Working Group, WIPO/GRTKF/IWG/3/16 (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.
wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_iwg_3/wipo_grtkf_iwg_3_16.pdf; WIPO Secretariat,
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, Third Intersessional Working Group, WIPO/GRTKF/IWG/3/16
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_iwg_3/wipo_grtkf_
iwg_3_16.pdf.
387. WIPO Secretariat, Consolidated Document Relating to Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources Rev. 2, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/4 (June 2, 2014), http://www.wipo.
int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_28/wipo_grtkf_ic_28_4.pdf [hereinafter Consolidated
Document Relating to Genetic Resources].
388. WIPO Secretariat, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Art. Rev. 2,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/5 (June 2, 2014), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_
grtkf_ic_28/wipo_grtkf_ic_28_5.pdf [hereinafter Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge].
389. WIPO Secretariat, The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: Draft
Art. Rev. 2, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/6 (June 2, 2014), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/
en/wipo_grtkf_ic_28/wipo_grtkf_ic_28_6.pdf.
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B. Current Proposals on the Disclosure Requirement
1. Positions of Countries
In the debates at the IGC, the developing countries led by Brazil, Peru,
India, China Namibia and South Africa have emerged as very strong
advocates for a mandatory disclosure requirement while the United States,
Japan and Korea have vigorously opposed it, with the EU maintaining a
middle ground.390
China, which houses the largest patent office in the world, views the
disclosure requirement to be an improvement to the existing intellectual
property system that “would help align the . . . system with the CBD, as
well as promote the implementation of prior informed consent and benefit
sharing in the use of genetic resources”391 To Peru, the disclosure requirement
would be a “vital part of patent applications” providing sufficient information
to patent offices to enable them to determine “whether there was an inventive
step to grant a patent.”392 In this regard, the patent office would “serve as
a check point or control point because that [is] where the decision would
be made on whether or not a particular product could be commercialized.”393
Brazil also supports the disclosure requirement as “the most effective
solution” to the problem of the misappropriation of genetic resources and
proposes sanctions, including revocation, for cases of non-compliance.394
In contrast, the U.S. argues that a disclosure requirement aimed at
promoting access and benefit-sharing arrangements would fall outside the
mandate of the IGC and it would be inappropriate to seek to use the patent
system “as a mechanism to enforce contracts.”395 In its view, “the patent
office could not be required to take on a new role as an enforcement
agency to regulate non-patent related issues such as source or origin of a
390. See Edward Hammond, WIPO Patent Disclosure Negotiations Stay on Track
but Consensus Will Prove Difficult, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.
twn.my/title2/biotk/2013/biotk130201.htm.
391. WIPO Secretariat, Report of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, ¶ 35, WIPO/GRTKF/
IC/23/8 Prov. 2 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_24/
wipo_grtkf_ic_24_ref_grtkf_23_8_prov_2.pdf [hereinafter IGC Report, Twenty-Third
Session].
392. Id. ¶ 37.
393. Id.
394. Id. ¶ 89.
395. Id. ¶ 33.
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[genetic resource].”396 Furthermore, the “patent examination process was
not a suitable mechanism for ensuring compliance with unrelated regulatory
requirements.”397 The U.S. is also concerned that a new patent disclosure
requirement would be burdensome398 to the patent applicant and add new
uncertainties to the patent system, including opening up a new avenue for
litigation.399 Moreover, “[b]inding or mandatory norms on [genetic resources]
disclosure in patent law would limit each country’s policy space.”400
Like the U.S., Japan contends that access and benefit sharing issues
have no place in patent law and “should only be considered in the context
of implementation of the Nagoya Protocol.” 401 To Japan, “mandatory
disclosure requirements would have a chilling effect on industries’ motivation
for applying for patents.”402 It explains that “the risks involved in identifying
source or origin in patent applications [are] enormous and the difficulties
of traceability could render the patent system one that discouraged rather
than encouraged innovation.”403
As an intermediate position, the EU “accept[s] the need for a disclosure
requirement but seek[s] it in a less robust form than developing countries.”404
At the very beginning of the debates at the IGC in 2005, the EU circulated
a document on its preferred approach,405 which it described as “fair,
balanced and proportionate”406 to access and benefit sharing issues and
which is “conscious of the importance of not introducing fresh burdens to

396. Id. ¶ 90.
397. Id.
398. According to the U.S.,
[i]n order to promote prompt disclosure and incentivize innovation, the requirements
placed upon the patent applicant must not be burdensome. Burdens must only be
those that were necessary to ensure that ordinary skilled persons in the same area
of technology could remake the invention, or burdens that were required to
ensure clarity in the claims of the patent application so that the scope of the
claims could be understood.
Id. ¶ 33.
399. Id. ¶ 62.
400. Id.
401. Id. ¶ 60.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Edward Hammond, WIPO Patent Disclosure Negotiations Stay on Track but
Consensus Will Prove Difficult, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.twn.my/
title2/biotk/2013/biotk130201.htm [hereinafter TWN, WIPO Patent Disclosure Negotiations].
405. See Disclosure of Origin or Source of Genetic Resources and Associated
Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, Submitted by the European Community
and Its Member States, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/8/11 (May 17, 2005), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_8/wipo_grtkf_ic_8_11.pdf [hereinafter EC Proposal].
406. WIPO IGC Report, Twenty-Third Session, supra note 391, ¶ 27.
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innovation, and more specifically, the patent examination process.”407
According to the EU, disclosure of origin “should be a set of formal
requirements, rather than an issue which required scrutiny during the
examination process [and] issues which arose from difficulties with this
method [a]re best remedied at the national level.”408
2. The Draft Negotiating Texts
a. Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources
The preamble of the Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources
identifies as important considerations for the disclosure requirement, the
building of trust, the strengthening of the supportiveness of intellectual
property and the access and benefit sharing system409 and minimization of
the harm to indigenous peoples caused by the patenting of genetic resources.410
These considerations are elaborated as specific policy objectives with
reference to the need to prevent the misappropriation of genetic resources,411
enhance transparency in the patent and access and benefit-sharing regime412
and ensure complementarity with relevant international instruments.413
With regards to the scope of the disclosure requirement, it is provided
in the Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources that where the
subject matter of a patent application is based on or derived from
traditional knowledge and genetic resources, a Contracting State should
require applicants to “[d]isclose the [country of origin [and]] [or if unknown,]
source of the genetic resources, [their derivatives] and/or [associated
traditional knowledge] [traditional knowledge associated with genetic
resources].”414 In addition, the applicants should be mandated to “[p]rovide
relevant information, as required by the national law of the [IP] [patent]
office, regarding compliance with ABS requirements, including PIC, [in
particular from indigenous [people[s]] and local communities], where

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id.
Id.
Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources, supra note 387, Preamble.
Id.
Id. Policy Objectives, ¶ (a).
Id. Policy Objectives, ¶ (b).
Id. Policy Objectives, ¶ (c).
Id. art. 3.1(a).
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appropriate.]”415 However, if the source or country of origin is not known,
the applicants are to provide a declaration to that effect.416
The proposed disclosure requirement does not obligate patent offices to
verify the contents of the disclosure, but envisages a technical assistance
role to enable applicants meet the requirement.417 Provision is also made
for notification418 and public disclosure of information received by the
patent offices.419
The Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources exempts human
genetic resources, derivatives, commodities and genetic resources acquired
before the adoption of the CBD from the disclosure requirement.420 The
proposed instrument is not intended to have retroactive effect and
consequently, would not apply to patents filed before its entry into force.421
415. Id. art. 3.1(b).
416. Id. art. 3.1(c).
417. Under one of the proposals, it is understood that:
The disclosure requirement [shall/should] [does] not place an obligation on the
[IP] [patent] offices to verify the contents of the disclosure. [But [IP] [patent]
offices are required to provide effective guidance to [IP] [patent] applicants on
how to meet disclosure requirements, and to provide an opportunity for applicants
to obtain from [IP] [patent] offices a positive decision that disclosure requirements
have been met.].
Id. art. 3.2.
418. Regarding notification, the proposed instrument notes,
[a] simple notification procedure shall/should be introduced by the [patent] [IP]
offices that receive a declaration. [It would be adequate to identify in particular
the Clearing House Mechanism of the CBD/ITPGRFA as the central body to
which the [IP] [patent] offices shall/should send the available information.].
Id. art. 3.3.
419. Under the Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources, “[[e]ach Party shall/
should make the information disclosed publically available at the time of publication.]”
Id. art. 3.4.
420. The exceptions and limitations are identified as follows:
A [IP] [patent] disclosure requirement related to genetic resources [their derivatives]
and [associated traditional knowledge] [traditional knowledge associated with
genetic resources] shall/should not apply to the following:
(a) [All [human genetic resources] [genetic resources taken from humans]
[including human pathogens];]
(b) [Derivatives];
(c) [Commodities];
(d) [Traditional knowledge in the public domain];
(e) [Genetic resources from areas beyond national jurisdictions [and
economic zones]]; and
(f) [All genetic resources [acquired] [accessed] before [entry into force
of the Convention on Biological Diversity] [before December 29th
1993].
Id. art. 4.1.
421. The Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources provides,
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However, it contemplates revisions of relevant international patent instruments
to incorporate the disclosure requirement.422
The scope of remedies for failure to meet the disclosure requirement
distinguishes between pre-grant and post-grant sanctions. The pre-grant
sanctions include termination of further processing of the application,
withdrawal of the application or denial of a patent,423 while the post-grant
sanctions would include fines or other damages, and publication of judicial
decisions on the failure to disclose.424 Depending on the circumstances,
and in accordance with national law, revocation could also be applied as
a post-grant sanction.425 It has been proposed that the failure to meet the
disclosure requirement not affect the enforceability of the patent, although

[[m]ember States shall/should not impose the disclosure requirement in this
instrument on [IP] [patent] applications filed before entry into force of thi s
instrument[, subject to national laws that existed prior to this instrument].]]
Id. art. 4.2.
422. As stated in the Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources,
The [PCT] and [PLT] shall/should be amended to [include] [enable Parties to
the [PCT] and [PLT] to provide for in their national legislation] a mandatory
disclosure requirement of the origin and source of the genetic resources, [their
derivatives] and [associated traditional knowledge] [traditional knowledge
associated with genetic resources]. The amendments shall/should also include
requiring confirmation of prior informed consent, evidence of benefit sharing
under mutually agreed terms with the country of origin.].
Id. art 5.1.
423. The Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources provides
[Each [Party] [country] shall/should put in place appropriate, effective and
proportionate legal and administrative measures to address non-compliance with
paragraph 3.1[, including dispute resolution mechanisms]. Subject to national
legislation, sanctions and remedies [shall/should] [may] [include, inter alia]
consist of:
(a) Pre-Grant.
(i) Preventing further processing of [IP] [patent] applications until
the disclosure requirements are met.
(ii) A [IP] [patent] office considering the application withdrawn [in
accordance with national law].
(iii) Preventing or refusing to grant an [IP right] [patent].
Id. art. 6.1, 6.1(a).
424. The post-grant sanctions include “(i) publication of judicial rulings regarding
failure to disclose” and “(ii) [Fines or adequate compensation for damages, including
payment of royalties.]” Id. art. 6(b)(i), (ii).
425. The instrument states that “[o]ther measures [including revocation] may be
considered depending on the circumstances of the case, in accordance with national law.”
Id. art. 6(b)(iii).
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an alternative provision would limit that proposal only to cases not involving
fraud.426
As a major opposition to the disclosure requirement, alternative language
has been proposed that would severely curtail and limit the disclosure
requirement only to purposes related to the patent criteria of novelty,
inventive step, industrial applicability or enablement.
[IP] [patent] applicants may only be required to state where the genetic resource
can be obtained if that location is necessary for a person skilled in the art to carry
out the invention. Therefore no disclosure requirements can be imposed upon
patent applicants or patentees for patents related to genetic resources, [th eir
derivatives] and [associated traditional knowledge] [traditional knowledge
associated with genetic resources], for reasons other than those related to novelty,
inventive step, industrial applicability or enablement.].427

b. Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge
The Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge provide for disclosure of
“information on the country from which the [inventor or the breeder]
applicant collected or received the knowledge (the providing country),
and the country of origin if the providing country is not the same as the
country of origin of the traditional knowledge.”428 The applicant is also
required to disclose “whether prior informed consent or approval and
involvement to access and use has been obtained. . . .”429 If the required
information is unknown to the applicant, he is nevertheless to state the
immediate source from which he collected or received the traditional
knowledge.430
An application that does not comply with the disclosure requirement
will not be processed and the patent office is given the discretion to select
a time for compliance failure, at which time the application would be
rejected.431 One of the proposals would prohibit revocation of patents on
grounds of non-compliance with the disclosure requirement, but allow
criminal sanctions including fines.432 However, an alternative proposal
would permit revocation and render the patent unenforceable for non426. Under the Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources,
[Failure to fulfill the disclosure requirement, [in the absence of fraud], shall/
should not affect the validity or enforceability of granted [IP] [patent] rights.]
Id. art. 6.2.
427. Id. art. 7.1.
428. Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge, supra note 388, art. 4 BIS.1.
429. Id.
430. Id. art. 4 BIS.2.
431. Id. art. 4 BIS.3.
432. Id. art. 4 BIS.4.
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compliance with the disclosure requirement or for providing fraudulent
information. 433 Finally, like the Consolidated Document on Genetic
Resources, the Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge contain language
that would prohibit disclosure of information unless it was material to the
patentability criteria of novelty, inventive step or enablement.434
3. Assessment
Some initial conclusions can be drawn from the Draft Negotiat ing
Texts, incomplete as they are, and an attempt made to define a way forward.
As described in the preceding survey, the main elements addressed in the
Draft Negotiating Texts include objectives, scope of the disclosure
requirement, exceptions and limitations, and remedies. The objectives of
preventing acts of misappropriation and enhancing transparency and the
supportiveness of the intellectual property system to the access of
traditional knowledge appear to be relatively non-controversial and could
be further refined to secure a cleaner text.
The provisions on exceptions and limitations also do not reveal significant
differences sufficient to scuttle agreement on the draft instruments,
although there could be some uneasiness in limiting the application of the
instruments only to access to genetic resources made after the entry into
force of the CBD.435 With respect to sanctions, the proposal to apply
revocation in post-grant proceedings could turn out to be a sticking point,
with some countries opposed to it altogether,436 while others would limit
it only to cases involving fraud.437
From the Draft Negotiating Texts, it is clear that even the critics are
agreeable to a disclosure requirement regarding traditional knowledge as
433. Id. Alternative art. 4 BIS.4.
434. Id. Alternative art. 4 BIS.
435. For a discussion on how Ghana has proposed that access to genetic resources
even before the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity be subject to the
disclosure requirement, see WIPO Intergovernmental Comment On Intellectual Property
& Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, Feb. 3-7, 2014, 26th Sess.
Report Adopted by the Committee, ¶ 120, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/26/8 (Mar. 24,
2014).
436. See WIPO IGC Rep o rt , Twe n t y - Th i rd S e ss io n , su p ra n ote 3 9 1 , ¶ 94 (citing
Australia’s opposition to revocation as a sanction); EC Proposal, supra note 405, ¶ 6
(discussing how the EU does not consider revocation to be an appropriate remedy for non compliance with the disclosure requirement).
437. See Swiss Proposals, supra note 288, ¶ 27.
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long as it was related to patent policy.438 The main area of divergence
arises in connection with matters that are perceived not to be relevant to
patent policy, such as access and benefit sharing regulations. As a
compromise, it may be possible to work out a framework for mandatory
disclosure of source or origin of genetic resources focusing specifically on
patent related grounds of novelty, utility, non-obviousness, and enablement.
To enhance the effectiveness of the proposed framework, the patent-related
conditions should be stated in broad terms and not in restrictive language
as found in some national laws.439 For example, the novelty standard could
be described to encompass knowledge or uses of inventions outside the
country without limitation to descriptions in printed publications, which
proved problematic in the biopiracy case involving basmati rice from
India.440 As part of the compromise, the option would be given to countries
to recognize additional considerations for disclosure related to the
implementation and monitoring of access and benefit sharing regulations.
To advance the objectives underlying the disclosure requirement,
information collected by the patent office should be made available to the
public as has been proposed in the Draft Negotiating Texts. Patent offices
should be required to cooperate and exchange general information amongst
themselves, and also send, receive, and respond to specific requests for
information. Such cooperation will be of tremendous value during the
examination of patent applications or prosecution of biopiracy cases.
While efforts can be made to find some areas of compromise as
suggested in this section, whether such consensus can be developed will
ultimately depend on the political will of the WIPO member countries.
Overall, the biggest threat to the adoption of an instrument regarding
disclosure appears to be a perceived uncompromising attitude between
proponents of the requirement and their critics.441 The latter may not be
favorably disposed to change their minds regardless of the persuasive
force or logic in arguments advanced by the proponents.

438. The alternative proposal tabled in the Consolidated Document on Genetic
Resources by critics of the disclosure requirement provides that “no disclosure requirements
can be imposed . . . for reasons other than those related to novelty, inventive step, industrial
applicability or enablement.” Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources, supra note 387,
art. 7.1.
439.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (stating that a valid prior art
references outside the US are limited to inventions described in printed publications in “a
foreign country.”). Section 102 of the U.S. Patent Act, valid prior art references outside
the US are limited to inventions described in printed publications in “a foreign country.”
440. Supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
441. See generally TWN, WIPO Patent Disclosure Negotiations, supra note 404.

66

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 17: 1, 2015]

10/7/2016 2:02 PM

Strategy to Combat Biopiracy
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

4. Comparisons with the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions and
the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty
It is useful to compare the Draft Negotiating Texts to both the 1982
WIPO Model Provisions and the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty to ascertain
whether there are any gaps in, and what improvements could be made to,
the Draft Negotiating Texts. An obvious area of difference is the scope
of application. While the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions and the 1984 WIPO
Draft Treaty apply to “expressions of folklore,”442 the Draft Negotiating
Texts cover genetic resources or related forms of traditional knowledge as
distinguished from folklore.
Under the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, disclosure of source is required in
“all printed publications, and in connection with any communications to
the public, of any identifiable expression of folklore,”443 by mentioning in
an appropriate manner, “the community and/or geographic place in which
it has originated.”444 An identical disclosure requirement is provided for
in the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions.445
Similar to the prior informed considerations of the access and benefit
sharing rules proposed in the Draft Negotiating Texts, the 1984 WIPO
Draft Treaty requires the prospective user of an expression of folklore to
submit in advance to the competent authority of the Contracting State in
which the expression of folklore originates, an application which “shall
unequivocally specify, in written form, the expression of folklore intended
to be used, its source, as well as the nature and extent of utilization.”446
This condition also applies to intended uses in other Contracting States
outside the jurisdiction where the expression of folklore originated.447
While prior authorization for use of folklore is required under the 1982
WIPO Model Provisions, the authorization controls are not as specific as
found in the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty.448

442. 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, supra note 244, art. 1; 1982 WIPO Model Provisions,
supra note 243, § 2.
443. 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, supra note 244, art 7(1).
444. Id. art. 7(2).
445. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, at § 5(1).
446. 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, supra note 244, art. 5(1).
447. Id. art. 4(1).
448. The 1982 WIPO Model Provisions merely require that authorization be obtained
from the competent authority of the community concerned. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions,
supra note 243, § 3; 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, supra note 244, art. 4(1).
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Like the Draft Negotiating Texts, both the 1982 WIPO Model
Provisions and the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty provide for exceptions and
limitations, as well as criminal and civil sanctions. The 1982 WIPO
Model Provisions and the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty do not apply where
folklore is to be used for educational purposes,449 to create original literary
or artistic works,450 or for incidental purposes.451 Significantly, the 1984
WIPO Draft Treaty makes it criminal offense punishable by appropriate
sanctions, to engage in any act of: (i) willful or negligent non-compliance
with the requirement to obtain authorization prior to use folklore; (ii)
willful or negligent non-compliance with the requirement to acknowledge
source of folklore; and (iii) willful deception of others in respect of the
origin of folklore.452 Damages and other civil remedies are available
“where the utilization was made without the required authorization or
payment or in any manner causing economic harm to the State or
community in which the utilized expression of folklore has originated.”453
The comparable provisions in the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions are far
more general and would criminalize willful and negligent failure to indicate
the source of identifiable expression of folklore454 or obtain authorization
prior to its use.455 These criminal penalties are to be applied “without prejudice
to damages or other civil remedies.”456
A noteworthy provision found in the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, but
not in either the 1984 WIPO Draft Provisions or Draft Negotiating Texts,
concerns the protection of expressions of folklore developed and maintained
in foreign countries. Under the 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, such
expressions are to be protected “subject to reciprocity or on the basis of
international treaties or other agreements.”457 As argued elsewhere, the
reciprocity principle would allow a country that may be reluctant to make

449. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, § 4(1)(i); 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty,
supra note 244, art. 6(1)(i).
450. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, § 4(1)(iii); 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty,
supra note 244, art. 6(1)(ii).
451. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, § 4(2); 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty,
supra note 244, art. 6(2).
452. 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, supra note 244, art. 8.
453. Id. art. 10.
454. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, § 6(1).
455. Id. § 6(2).
456. Id. § 8.
457. 1982 WIPO Model Provisions, supra note 243, § 14.
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changes to its national laws, to enter into appropriate arrangements with
foreign governments to protect foreign folklore found in its territory.458
From a review of the provisions of the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty, the
conclusion is inescapable that it contains all the key principles reflected
in the current Draft Negotiating Texts, including disclosure, prior informed
consent, and sanctions. It is quite remarkable that the 1984 WIPO Draft
Treaty states those principles with perhaps greater clarity and more succinctly
than found in the current Draft Negotiating Texts. A legitimate question
to ask in this context, therefore, is whether it was worth all the time,
resources and effort of the IGC to produce the Draft Negotiating Texts,
which do not appear to be much of an improvement on the earlier instruments.
In hindsight, it would have been a far more efficient process for the IGC
to have begun its deliberations on a possible international instrument using
as a template the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty. As the work product of an
Expert Committee created by WIPO in 1984, it certainly qualified for
serious consideration by the IGC as a recommendation coming from the
previous WIPO committee.
C. Fate of the Intergovernmental Committee
During its twenty-eighth session in July 2014, the IGC discussed the
cross cutting elements of the Consolidated Document on Genetic Resources
and the Draft Articles on Traditional Knowledge.459 It confirmed that the
texts as developed during previous sessions would be transmitted to the
WIPO General Assembly in September 2014,460 but the IGC was unable
to agree on the language of a recommendation to submit to the WIPO
General Assembly proposing specific action to be taken with respect to
the documents. In lieu of a recommendation, the IGC decided that “statements
made on this matter during the final discussion in the Twenty-Eighth session
. . . be transmitted to the WIPO General Assembly for its consideration.”461

458. Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition Agreements
as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the
United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 697 (2007).
459. WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/28/11 Prov. 2, ¶ 110
(2014).
460. Id.
461. Id. ¶ 112.
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In the absence of a proposed draft decision from the IGC for
consideration by the WIPO General Assembly, the Chairman of the WIPO
General Assembly by default and on her own initiative 462 prepared and
submitted a draft decision for consideration calling on the IGC to “meet
in 2015 in order to make a recommendation to the 2015 General Assembly
as to the mandate of the IGC for the 2016/2017 biennium.”463 However,
after some intense deliberations, the WIPO General Assembly was not
able to arrive at a consensus on the proposed draft, and no decision was
taken with regards to the Chairman’s proposals.464 The practical effect of
this development was that the mandate of the IGC was not renewed for
2015.
Statements made during the WIPO General Assembly debates reveal
the wide gaps in the various positions held by the delegations that proved
difficult to bridge. Speaking on behalf of the African Group, Kenya noted
that the IGC had made very substantive progress and was ready to take
the final decision to convene a diplomatic conference in accordance with
the mandate of the IGC.465 Accordingly, the African Group proposed to
amend the Chairman’s proposals to allow for the convening of a diplomatic
conference in 2016 to adopt a legally binding instrument or instruments
for the effective protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge
and traditional cultural expressions.466
In the same vein, India observed that the IGC process had made
considerable and significant progress pointing to the three texts that had
been developed.467 It noted that there had been a fair amount of productive
engagement, and that the texts had improved substantially. India proposed
that the IGC continue its text-based negotiations with a view to deciding
on convening a diplomatic conference in 2016, that three t hematic
sessions be held in 2015, and that a stock-taking meeting follow these
sessions, to allow countries and groups to voice their opinions and engage
constructively on the texts and thereby arrive at a decision at the 2015
WIPO General Assembly.468

462. Report of the World Intellectual Property Organization General Assembly, 46th
Sess., ¶ 152, WO/GA/46/12 (2014).
463. Id.
464. Id. ¶ 154–73.
465. Id. ¶ 153
466. Id.
467. Id. ¶ 159.
468. Id.
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Brazil also praised the quality of the work done by the IGC but
bemoaned what it saw as a calculated effort to derail the IGC process.469
According to Brazil, there were only a few minor issues on the subject of
genetic resources that remained to be resolved so it was possible that a
diplomatic conference could be convened in the near future. It attributed
the success of the IGC to the tiered approach that had been adopted and
that made it possible to agree on “an international legal instrument or
instruments with the necessary flexibility to accommodate the different
concerns expressed by delegations.”470
In contrast to the preceding optimistic views, Japan asserted that
throughout the IGC process in 2014, there had been a lack of common
understanding on policy objectives and guiding principles, which had led
to a divergence.471 According to Japan, further technical work was required
to lead to a shared understanding of the key issues and that the IGC had
not reached the phase where a political decision was required.472 The US
supported the statement made by Japan noting that it could “neither agree
to convene a diplomatic conference, nor agree on the nature of an
instrument before knowing its contents.”473
On its part, the European Union delegation remarked that the discussions
of the IGC in 2014 had been fruitful and some limited progress had been
made.474 However, a significant number of issues that were fundamentally
important needed to be resolved before the next stages of the work could
be considered. The European Union reiterated its understanding that any
international instrument(s) to be created should be “non-binding, flexible,
evidence-based and sufficiently clear.”475
On account of these divergent views, it was not possible to arrive at a
consensus on a work program for the IGC. Accordingly, unless the WIPO
General Assembly decides to renew the mandate of the IGC in the near
future, work by the IGC on traditional knowledge, including the disclosure
requirement has effectively ceased.

469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.

Id. ¶ 166.
Id.
Id. ¶ 155.
Id.
Id. ¶ 170.
Id. ¶ 158.
Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Examination of the provisions in the most recent negotiating texts
developed by WIPO reveals that they are incomplete and contain alternative
and sometimes conflicting provisions that will require further refinement
and alignment to be ready for adoption as binding instruments. For those
WIPO Member countries that are generally supportive of the disclosure
requirement, the discrepancies may be seen as minor which could be
ironed out in future sessions of the IGC.476 However for others that remain
rigidly opposed to the requirement, such hopes may not be realistic, leaving
the distinct possibility that consensus may not be found to submit even a
significantly improved text to a diplomatic conference for consideration
for eventual adoption by WIPO. Because opponents of the disclosure
requirement also happen to be countries where most of the acts of
biopiracy have taken place, including the US and the European Union,
even if an instrument on traditional knowledge were to be adopted by
WIPO, it will not be effective in tackling the problem to the extent those
countries or regions refuse to ratify it.
That it has taken more than 14 years to cover so little ground at the IGC
suggests the lack of interest by the traditional knowledge user countries
and may even be evidence of their efforts to stall the process and drag it
out interminably.477 In this context, it is quite disconcerting that the WIPO
General Assembly could not agree to extend the mandate of the IGC
whose activities have now practically ground to a halt. If it proves impossible
to renew the IGC’s mandate to continue its work, there will be an urgent
need for like-minded traditional knowledge provider countries in collaboration
with interested traditional knowledge user countries to respond to the void
by working to develop solutions under bilateral, regional or other multilateral
arrangements for the protection of traditional knowledge.
Under those circumstances, advocates for an enhanced protective
regime would need to consider the development of a new instrument
perhaps using the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty as a template to be adapted to
cover the unique aspects of traditional knowledge and genetic resources.

476. See id. ¶ 166.
477. The U.S. may not be quite enthused about the development by WIPO of an
international instrument on traditional knowledge. As one commentator has noted, American
support for WIPO’s program on traditional knowledge was provided after assurances from
WIPO that it was “not ‘on a norm setting track’; that is to say, that its work is not intended
to feed into a process which would end with the creation of a treaty or recommendations.”
Michael Halewood, Indigenous and Local Knowledge in International Law: A Preface to
Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection, 44 MCGILL L.J. 953, 986 (1999).

72

KURUK (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 17: 1, 2015]

10/7/2016 2:02 PM

Strategy to Combat Biopiracy
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

For example, utilization of folklore as a trigger for the disclosure of the
source or origin in the 1984 WIPO Draft Treaty could be extended in the
new instrument by defining utilization to include the acquisition of
intellectual property in traditional knowledge and genetic resources in or
outside the provider country and mandating disclosure as part of the
intellectual property rights acquisition process where the rights are based
on or derived from the traditional knowledge or genetic resources. The
applicant should be required to verify whether any portion of its claims
are based on or derived from traditional knowledge or genetic resources,
perhaps by simply checking a box in the application. Access and benefit
sharing considerations could be dealt with in a similar manner by also
requiring applicants to verify whether they have complied with the relevant
prior informed consent and benefit sharing rules.
To assuage the concerns of intellectual property rights purists, it should
be clarified that the proposed instrument would not require amendments
to substantive intellectual property laws. Instead, for purposes of implementing
the instrument, appropriate administrative guidelines would be issued to
patent examining authorities. While access and benefit sharing policies
will continue to be relevant under the proposed framework, they are not
likely to spark the same level of outrage as when stated specifically as
conditions for patent rights.
Although the proposed framework maybe somewhat weakened by not
calling for revisions of substantive patent laws to incorporate the disclosure
requirement, it would still be useful and have practically the same effect
as the proposed revisions of patent laws by establishing a legal basis
suggesting at a minimum that the disclosure considerations could not be
ignored altogether. The verification system recommended here would be
sufficient to prompt investigation by examining authorities regarding uses
of traditional knowledge and genetic resources to inform the patent
examination process, or by right holders to enable them seek compensation
and/or challenge the patent application, as the case may be. It is submitted
that such a compromise position may be acceptable to a greater number
of countries and increase the chances of agreeing on the text of an international
instrument addressing the essential objectives of the disclosure requirement.
Negotiations on the development of such a text could be carried under
the auspices of WIPO if there is a consensus to that effect, or outside the
WIPO framework led by interested countries or regions. The treaty resulting
from this process by the like-minded countries would be opened for later
ratification by others who may come to perceive benefits in so doing after
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the treaty has been in force for some time. Even for countries that refuse
to ratify it, the principles of protection outlined in the new treaty could
inform and be the subject of bilateral agreements they may choose to enter
into with the traditional knowledge provider countries and which may
include commitments to protect traditional knowledge under notions of
reciprocity.478

478.

74

See, e.g., Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur, supra note 458, at 695–711.

